MORALITY AND RELIGION

Articles by H. P. Blavatsky
A FEW THOUGHTS ON SOME WISE WORDS FROM A WISE MAN
EDITORIAL COMMENT
THEOSOPHY OR JESUITISM?
LEO TOLSTOI AND HIS UNECCLESIASTICAL CHRISTIANITY
DIAGNOSES AND PALLIATIVES

H. P. BLAVATSKY SERIES • NO. 17
THEOSOPHY COMPANY (MYSORE) PRIVATE LTD.
BANGALORE 560004
FOREWORD

The opening article in this series of discussions of theistic religion, East and West, makes clear the position of H.P.B.—and therefore of Theosophy—regarding liberty of thought and conscience. It should be, she says, untrammeled and entire, as man’s “fundamental and essential prerogative.” Strongly objecting to proselyting, an activity which assumes that one can know better than another what that other should accept or believe, she readily adopts the impartial stance of philosophical agnosticism. She calls the Stoics to the defense of the atheist and declares that the essentials of universal ethics belong to all religions and may be as truly practiced by freethinkers. “A Few Thoughts on Some Wise Words from a Wise Man” appeared in the *Theosophist* for June, 1883. While initially a comment on the Theism advocated by a spokesman for the Brahmo Somaj—a movement within Hinduism founded in India by Ramohun Roy earlier in the century—H.P.B.’s criticism of the personal God idea, as a belief without intrinsic value and supporting evidence, is extended to include Christian Theism.

The material headed “Editorial Comment” appeared without title in the Correspondence section of *Lucifer* for December, 1887. (The article, ‘Let Every Man Prove His Own Work,” to which the letters considered refer, was reprinted in the pamphlet, *Basic Questions About Theosophy.*) Here, again, H.P.B. denounces the presumptions of sectarianism and points to the ineffectual moral influence of “Churchianity” in contrast to its exclusive pretensions. At the same time, she observes that whether the Jesus of the New Testament lived or not, the Jesus of Matthew and John might serve as an ideal for the Theosophist. In this brief review, H.P.B. again rises to the defense of atheists and unorthodox religionists, holding up Robert Ingersoll and Count Tolstoi as examples of “infidels” who might be
adopted by Christians as models in both private and public life.

“Theosophy or Jesuitism?” was apparently occasioned by correspondence from troubled students who thought that care should be taken by Theosophical publications to avoid incurring the enmity of the Jesuits. This documented account of the beliefs, practices, and role in history of the Jesuits, printed in *Lucifer* for June, 1888, was her reply.

Of all European writers contemporary with H P.B., none was so highly praised by her as the famous novelist, Leo Tolstoi, excepting, perhaps, only Dostoevski, who she singled out for unique appreciation in her article, “The Tidal Wave.” Today, Tolstoi is commonly regarded as having been the most widely and deeply influential reformer of his age. His relations with Gandhi are well known, and the extent of his inspiration to unnumbered communitarians, pacifists, and other workers for human good, known and unknown, can hardly be estimated. Tolstoi’s *My Confession*, to which H.P.B. refers, illustrates the unblinking honesty and passionate devotion to truth that Tolstoi exhibited throughout his life. The article, “Leo Tolstoi and his Unecclesiastical Christianity,” appeared in *Lucifer* for September, 1890.

“Diagnoses and Palliatives” was published in *Lucifer* for July, 1890. Here H.P.B. makes use of *The Kreutzer Sonata*, a novel by Tolstoi—whom she identifies as “the greatest psychologist of this [the nineteenth] century”—to reveal the hypocrisies of sexual morality in the West; then, turning to a magazine article by the Positivist and evolutionist, Grant Allen, she considers the “sexual ethics” that was developing out of modern materialism, providing illustrations of the proud animalism which, during the twentieth century, became fashionable and widely accepted doctrine. The spread of such opinions gave H.P.B. full justification for saying, in *The Secret Doctrine* (II, 110), that the civilized nations have succeeded in making of vice an art, and of selfishness an ethical characteristic.

---

**A FEW THOUGHTS ON SOME WISE WORDS FROM A WISE MAN**

In an article, in the *Tatwa BodhiniPatrika* “TheEssential Religion,” Babu Rajnarain Bose, the well known Brahmo, prefacing it with a quotation from Ramohun Roy’s Trust Deed of the Adi Brahmo Somaj, “which is an injunction, with regard to Strengthening the bonds of union between men of all religious persuasions, and creeds”—makes the following wise remarks.

We should regulate our conduct by keeping a constant eye upon the essentials of religion. We are apt to lose sight of them in the mists of sectarian prejudice, partiality and passion. We are apt to forget them in the heat of religious discussion, in the distraction of philosophical speculation, in the excitement of religious delight and in the engrossment of ceremonial observances. . . . We are so bent upon thrusting our own particular opinions on non-essential points of religion on others that we consider them to be essentially necessary for salvation. We are apt to forget that we ourselves are not infallible, that our own opinions on all subjects of human interest were not exactly the same twenty years ago as they are now, nor will they be exactly the same twenty years afterwards as they are now. We are apt to forget that all the members of our own sect or party, if they frankly reveal their whole minds, do not hold exactly the same opinions on all subjects concerning religion as we do. We are apt to forget that the religious opinions of man are subject to progress and they will not be the same a century afterwards as they are now. We, Theists, have as much right to say that men of other religions, less advanced in religious knowledge than we are, will not be saved, as Theists who will live centuries hence will have of saying that we, the present Theists, will not have been saved on account of our errors. Fallible man cannot with good grace be a dogmatist. We should be more mindful of performing our religious and moral duties and drawing men’s attention to those duties than dogmatically thrusting our particular opinions on particular points of religious doctrine upon others.

Learned dissertations on theology and controversies on the subject of religion are useful in their own way, but true religion before the Lord does
MORALITY AND RELIGION

not consist in them. It consists in a man’s *’Visiting the fatherless and the widow in their affliction and keeping himself unspotted from the world,” that is, from vice.

... Some people consider processions, festivals and religious music as the be-all and end-all of religion. They are no doubt useful in their own way, but they are not the be-all and end-all of religion. Life is the be-all and end-all of religion. . . .

We should not only regulate our own conduct by an eye to the essentials of religion, but, while propagating the religion we profess, we should draw men’s attention more to love of God and love of man than doctrinal points. We are morally culpable before God if we lay greater stress on the husk instead of the kernel of religion.

The Essential Religion does not admit of church organization. There can be no such sect as the Essential Religionists. The Essential Religion is not the exclusive property of any particular sect or church. It is the common property of all sects and churches. The members of all sects and churches should regulate their conduct according to its dictates. . . . Besides, a number of men, banded together and calling themselves Essential Religionists, must have particular conception of the Deity and future state and follow a particular mode of worship. This particular conception and particular mode of worship would at once determine them as a sect. These particular conceptions of God and future state and modes of worship give rise to religious sects among mankind. Every individual man cannot avoid joining a sect according to his own particular convictions.

Differences of religion must always exist in the world.1 To quote Parker. . . . “As many men so many theologies.” As it is impossible to obliterate differences of face and make all faces exactly resemble each other, so it is difficult to obliterate distinctions of religion. Differences of religion have always existed in the world and will exist as long as it lasts. It is impossible to bring over men to one and the same religion. A certain king remarked: “It is impossible to make all watches go exactly alike. How is it possible to bring over all men to my own opinion?” Various flowers would always exist in the garden of religion, each having a peculiar fragrance of its own, Theism being the most fragrant of them all. Bearing this in mind, we should tolerate all religions, though at the same time propagating the religion which we consider to be true—we are told. It is our painful duty to analyze these words, and we begin by asking why should we? Where is the necessity for imposing our own personal views, our beliefs pro tern, if we may use the expression, upon other persons who, each and all must be allowed to possess—until the contrary is shown—as good a faculty of discrimination and judgment as we believe ourselves to be endowed with? We say belief pro tern basing the expression upon the writer’s own confession.

“We should tolerate all religions, though at the same time, propagating the religion which we consider to be true—we are told. It is our painful duty to analyze these words, and we begin by asking why should we? Where is the necessity for imposing our own personal views, our beliefs pro tern, if we may use the expression, upon other persons who, each and all must be allowed to possess—until the contrary is shown—as good a faculty of discrimination and judgment as we believe ourselves to be endowed with? We say belief pro tern basing the expression upon the writer’s own confession.

1 We beg to differ from this opinion of our kind friend.—Ed.

Buddhism as an atheistical religion. Even if it were true that Buddhism is a system of pure atheism, which it is not, the phrase “atheistical religion” is a contradiction in terms. There can be no religion if divorced from God. Later researches have proved that Buddhism is not without the idea of a God as was formerly supposed.2 We should tolerate all religions. We should look upon all religions, every one of which contains greater or less truth, as God himself looks upon them, rejoicing in the truth which each contains and attributing its errors to human imperfection. . . .

These are as noble and as conciliating words as were ever pronounced among the Brahmós of India. They would be calculated to do a world of good, but for the common doom of words of wisdom to become the “voice crying in the desert.” Yet even in these kindly uttered sentences, so full of benevolence and good will to all men, we cannot help discerning (we fervently hope, that Babu Rajnarain Bose will pardon our honest sincerity) a ring of a certain sectarian, hence selfish feeling, one against which our Society is forced to fight so desperately.

“We should tolerate all religions, though at the same time, propagating the religion which we consider to be true—we are told. It is our painful duty to analyze these words, and we begin by asking why should we? Where is the necessity for imposing our own personal views, our beliefs pro tern, if we may use the expression, upon other persons who, each and all must be allowed to possess—until the contrary is shown—as good a faculty of discrimination and judgment as we believe ourselves to be endowed with? We say belief pro tern basing the expression upon the writer’s own confession.

“We should tolerate all religions, though at the same time, propagating the religion which we consider to be true—we are told. It is our painful duty to analyze these words, and we begin by asking why should we? Where is the necessity for imposing our own personal views, our beliefs pro tern, if we may use the expression, upon other persons who, each and all must be allowed to possess—until the contrary is shown—as good a faculty of discrimination and judgment as we believe ourselves to be endowed with? We say belief pro tern basing the expression upon the writer’s own confession.

2 We believe It’s a great mistake due to the one-sided inferences and precipitate conclusions of some Orientalists like Mr. Lillie, the author of ‘Buddha and Early Buddhism.” An eternal, all-pervading principle is not what is vulgarly called “God.” —Ed. Theos.
persuasion—into a groove we may ourselves abandon twenty years hence? But, we may be perhaps reminded by the esteemed writer that in penning those sentences which we have underlined, he referred but to the “non-essential points”—or sectarian dogmas, and not to what he is pleased to call the “essential” points of religion, viz.,—belief in God or theism. We answer by enquiring again, whether the latter tenet—a tenet being something which has to rest upon its own intrinsic value and undeniable evidence—whether notwithstanding, until very lately its universal acceptance,—this tenet is any better proven, or rests upon any firmer foundation than any of the existing dogmas which are admitted by none but those who accept the authority they proceed from? Are not in this case, both tenet and dogmas, the “essentials” as the “non-essentials,” simply the respective conclusions and outcome of “fallible minds”? And can it be maintained that theism itself with its present crude ideas about an intelligent personal deity a little better than a super-humanly conscious big man—will not 20 years hence have reached not only a broader and more noble aspect, but even a decided turning point which will lead humanity to a far higher ideal in consequence of the scientific truths it acquires daily and almost hourly? It is from a strictly agnostic platform that we are now arguing, basing what we say merely upon the writer’s own words. And we maintain that the major premiss of his general proposition which may be thus formulated—"a personal God is,—while dogmas may or may not be true"—being simply admitted, never proven, since the existence of God in general was, is, and ever will remain an unprovable proposition, his conclusions however correctly derived from the minor or second premiss do not cover the whole ground. The syllogism is regular and the reasoning valid—only in the opinion of the theists. The atheist as the agnostic will protest, having logic as well as reason on his side. He will say: Why not accord to others that which you claim for yourselves? However weighty our arguments &nd gentle our persuasion, no theist would fail to feel hurt were we to try our hand in persuading him to throw away his theism and accept the religion or philosophy “which we consider to be true”—namely, “godless” Buddhism, or highly philosophical and logical agnosticism. As our esteemed contemporary puts it,—“it is impossible to obliterate differences of face and make all faces exactly resemble each other.” Has the idea ever struck him that it is as difficult to entirely obliterate innate differences of mental perceptions and faculties, let alone to reconcile by bringing them under one standard the endless varieties of human nature and thought? The latter may be forced from its natural into an artificial channel. But like a mask however securely stuck on one’s face, and which is liable to be torn off by the first strong gust of wind that blows under, the convictions thus artificially inoculated are liable at any day to resume their natural course—the new cloth put upon the old garment torn out, and—“the rent made worse.” We are with those who think that as nature has never intended the process known in horticulture as engrafting, so she has never meant that the ideas of one man should be inoculated with those of any other man, since were it so she would have—if really guided by intelligence—created all the faculties of human mind, as all plants, homogeneous, which is not the case. Hence, as no kind of plant can be induced to grow and thrive artificially upon another plant which does not belong to the same natural order, so no attempt toward engrafting our views and beliefs on individuals whose mental and intellectual capacities differ from ours as one variety or species of plants differs from another variety—will ever be successful. The missionary efforts directed for several hundred years toward christianizing the natives of India, is a good instance in hand and illustrates the inevitable failure following every such fallacious attempt. Very few among those natives upon whom the process of engrafting succeeded, have any real merit; while the tendency of the great majority is to return to its original specific type, that of a true-born pantheistic Hindu, clinging to his forefathers’ caste and gods as a plant clings to its original genera. “Love of God and love of man is the essence of religion,” says Babu Rajnarain Bose elsewhere, inviting men to withdraw their attention from the husk of religion—“the non-essentials” and concentrate it upon the kernel—its essentials. We doubt whether we will ever prove our love to man by depriving him of a fundamental and essential prerogative, that of an untrammelled and entire liberty of his thoughts and conscience. Moreover in saying, as the author does further on—
Nothing has done so much mischief to the world as religious bigotry and dogmatism on non-essential points of religion; nothing has led so much to bloody wars and fiery persecutions as the same... —he turns the weapon of logic and fact against his own argument. What religion, for instance, ever claimed more than Christianity “love of God and love of man”—aye, “love of all men as our brothers”; and yet where is that creed that has ever surpassed it in blood-thirstiness and cruelty, in intolerance to the damnation of all other religions! “What crimes has it (Religion in general) not committed?” exclaims Prof. Huxley quoting from Lucretius, and “what cruelties,” he adds, referring to Christianity—”have been perpetrated in the name of Him who said ‘Love your enemies; blessed are the peacemakers,’ and so many other noble things.” Truly this religion of Love and Charity is now built upon the most gigantic holocaust of victims, the fruits of the unlawful, sinful desire to bring over all men to one mode of thinking, at any rate to one “essential” point in their religion—belief in Christ. We admit and recognize fully that it is the duty of every honest man to try to bring round by “argument and gentle persuasion” every man who errs with respect to the “essentials” of Universal ethics, and the usually recognized standard of morality. But the latter is the common property of all religions, as of all the honest men, irrespective of their beliefs. The principles of the true moral code, tried by the standard of right and justice, are recognized as fully, and followed just as much by the honest atheist as by the honest theist, religion and piety having, as can be proved by statistics, very little to do with the repression of vice and crime. A broad line has to be drawn between the external practice of one’s moral and social duties, and that of the real intrinsic virtue practised but for its own sake. Genuine morality does not rest with the profession of any particular creed or faith, least of all with belief in gods or a God; but it rather depends upon the degree of our own individual perceptions of its direct bearing upon human happiness in general, hence—upon our own personal weal. But even this is surely not all. “So long as man is taught and allowed to believe that he must be just, that the strong hand of law may not punish him, or his neighbour taking his revenge”; that he must be enduring because complaint is useless and weakness can only bring contempt; that he must be temperate, that his health may keep good and all his appetites retain their acuteness; and, he is told that, if he serves his friends, his friends may serve him, if he defends his country, he defends himself, and that by serving his God he prepares for himself an eternal life of happiness hereafter —so long, we say, as he acts on such principles, virtue is no virtue, but verily the culmination of SELFFISHNESS. However sincere and ardent the faith of a theist, unless, while conforming his life to what he pleases to term divine laws, he gives precedence in his thoughts first to the benefit that accrues from such a moral course of actions to his brother, and then only thinks of himself—he will remain at best—a pious egotist; and we do claim that belief in, and fear of God in man, is chiefly based upon, develops and grows in exact proportion to his selfishness, his fear of punishment and bad results only for himself, without the least concern for his brother. We see daily that the theist, although defining morality as the conformity of human actions to divine laws, is not a little more moral than the average atheist or infidel who regards a moral life simply the duty of every honest right-thinking man without giving a thought to any reward for it in afterlife. The apparently discrepant fact that one who disbelieves in this survival after death should, nevertheless, frame in most cases his life in accordance with the highest rules of morality, is not as abnormal as it seems at first. The atheist, knowing of but one existence, is anxious to leave the memory of his life as unsullied as possible in the after-remembrances of his family and posterity, and in honour even with those yet unborn. In the words of the Greek Stoic—“though all our fellow-men were swept away, and not a mortal nor immortal eye were left to approve or condemn, should we not here, within our breast, have a judge to dread, and a friend to conciliate?” No more than the theism is atheism congenite with man. Both grow and develop in him together with his reasoning powers, and become either fortified or weakened by reflection and deduction of evidence from facts. In short, both are entirely due to the degree of his emotional nature, and man is no more responsible for being an atheist than he is for becoming a theist. Both terms are entirely misunderstood. Many are called impious not for having a worse but a different religion, from their neighbours, says Epicurus. Mahomedans
are stronger theists than the Christians, yet they are called “infidels” by the latter, and many are the theoso-phists regarded as atheists, not for the denying of the Deity but for thinking somewhat peculiarly concerning this ever-to-be unknown Principle. As a living contrast to the atheist, stands the theist believing in other lives or a life to come. Taught by his creed that prayer, repentance and offerings are capable of obliterating sin in the sight of the “all-forgiving, loving and merciful Father in Heaven,” he is given every hope—the strength of which grows in proportion to the sincerity of his faith—that his sins will be remitted to him. Thus, the moral obstacle between the believer and sin is very weak, if we view it from the standpoint of human nature. The more a child feels sure of his parents’ love for him, the easier he feels it to break his father’s commands. Who will dare to deny that the chief, if not the only cause of half the misery with which Christendom is afflicted—especially in Europe, the stronghold of sin and crime—lies not so much with human depravity as with its belief in the goodness and infinite mercy of “our Father in Heaven,” and especially in the vicarious atonement? Why should not men imagine that they can drink of the cup of vice with impunity—at any rate, in its results in the hereafter—when one half of the population is offered to purchase absolution for its sins for a certain paltry sum of money, and the other has but to have faith in, and place reliance upon, Christ to secure a place in paradise—though he be a murderer, starting for it right from the gallows! The public sale of indulgences for the perpetration of crime on the one hand, and the assurance made by the ministers of God that the consequences of the worst of sins may be obliterated by God at his will and pleasure, on the other, are quite sufficient, we believe, to keep crime and sin at the highest figure. He, who loves not virtue and good for their own sake and shuns not vice as vice, is sure to court the latter as a direct result of his pernicious belief. One ought to despise that virtue which prudence and fear alone direct.

We firmly believe in the actuality and the philosophical necessity of “Karma,” i.e., in that law of unavoidable retribution, the not-to-be diverted effect of every cause produced by us, reward as punishment in strict conformity with our actions; and we maintain that since no one can be made responsible for another man’s religious beliefs with whom, and with which, he is not in the least concerned—that perpetual craving for the conversion of all men we meet to our own modes of thinking and respective creeds becomes a highly reprehensible action. With the exception of those above-mentioned cases of the universally recognized code of morality, the furtherance or neglect of which has a direct bearing upon human weal or woe, we have no right to be influencing our neighbours’ opinions upon purely transcendental and unproveable questions, the speculations of our emotional nature. Not because any of these respective beliefs are in any way injurious or bad per se; on the contrary, for every ideal that serves us as a point of departure and a guiding star in the path of goodness and purity, is to be eagerly sought for, and as unswervingly followed: but precisely on account of those differences and endless variety of human temperaments, so ably pointed out to us by the respected Brahmo gentleman in the lines as above quoted. For if, as he truly points out—none of us is infallible, and that “the religious opinions of men are subject to progress” (and change, as he adds), that progress being endless and quite likely to upset on any day our strongest convictions of the day previous; and that as historically and daily proved “nothing has done so much mischief” as the great variety of conflicting creeds and sects which have led but to bloody wars and persecutions, and the slaughter of one portion of mankind by the other, it becomes an evident and an undeniable fact that, by adding converts to those sects, we add but so many antagonists to fight and tear themselves to pieces, if not now, then at no distant future. And in this case we do become responsible for their actions. Propagandism and conversion are the fruitful seeds sown for the perpetration of future crimes, the odium theologicum stirring up religious hatreds—which relate as much to the “Essentials” as to the non-essentials of any religion—being the most fruitful as the most dangerous for the peace of mankind. In Christendom, where at each street-corner starvation cries for help: where pauperism, and its direct result, vice and crime, fill the land with desolation—millions upon millions are annually spent upon this unprofitable and sinful work of proselytism. With that charming inconsistency which was ever the characteristic of the Christian
churches, the same Bishops who have opposed but a few decades back the building of railways, on the ground that it was an act of rebellion against God who willed that man should not go quite as quick as the wind; and had opposed the introduction of the telegraphy, saying that it was a tempting of Providence; and even the application of anaesthetics in obstetrical cases, “under the pretence,” Prof. Draper tells us, “that it was an impious attempt to escape from the curse denounced against all women in Genesis iii, 16.” those same Bishops do not hesitate to meddle with the work of Providence when the “heathen” are concerned. Surely if Providence hath so decreed that women should be left to suffer for the sin of Eve, then it must have also willed that a man born a heathen should be left one as—pre-ordained. Are the missionaries wiser, they think, than their God, that they should try to correct his mistakes; and do they not also rebel against Providence, and its mysterious ways? But leaving aside things as dark to them as they are to us, and viewing “conversion” so called, but from its practical aspect, we say that he, who under the dubious pretext that because something is truth to him it must be truth also for everyone else, labours at the conversion of his neighbours, is simply engaged in the unholy work of breeding and raising future Cains.

Indeed, our “love of man” ought to be strong enough and sufficiently intuitional to stifle in us that spark of selfishness which is the chief motor in our desire to force upon our brother and neighbour our own religious opinions and views which we may “consider (for the time being) to be true.” It is a grand thing to have a worthy Ideal, but a still greater one to live up to it; and where is that wise and infallible man who can show without fear of being mistaken to another man what or who should be his ideal? If, as the theist assures us—“God is all in all”—then must he be in every ideal—whatever its nature, if it neither clashes with recognized morality, nor can it be shown productive of bad results. Thus, whether this Ideal be God, the pursuit of Truth, humanity collectively, or, as John Stuart Mill has so eloquently proved, simply our own country; and that in the name of that ideal man not only works for it, but becomes better himself, creating thereby an example of morality and goodness for others to follow, what matters it to his neighbour whether this ideal be a chimerical Utopia, an abstraction, or even an inanimate object in the shape of an idol, or a piece of clay?

Let us not meddle with the natural bent of man’s religious or irreligious thought, any more than we should think of meddling with his private thoughts, lest by so doing we should create more mischief than benefit, and deserve thereby his curses. Were religions as harmless and as innocent as the flowers with which the author compares them, we would not have one word to say against them. Let every “gardener” attend but his own plants without forcing unasked his own variety upon those of other people, and all will remain satisfied. As popularly understood, Theism has, doubtless, its own peculiar beauty, and may well seem “the most fragrant of flowers in the garden of religions”—to the ardent theist. To the atheist, however, it may possibly appear no better than a prickly thistle; and the theist has no more right to take him to task for his opinion, than the atheist has to blame him for his horror of atheism. For all its beauty it is an ungrateful task to seek to engraft the rose upon the thistle, since in nine cases out of ten the rose will lose its fragrance, and both plants their shapes to become a monstrous hybrid. In the economy of nature everything is in its right place, has its special purpose, and the same potentiality for good as for evil in various degrees—if we will but leave it to its natural course. The most fragrant rose has often the sharpest thorns; and it is the flowers of the thistle when pounded and made up into an ointment that will cure the wounds made by her cruel thorns the best.

In our humble opinion, the only “Essentials” in the Religion of Humanity are—virtue, morality, brotherly love, and kind sympathy with every living creature, whether human or animal. This is the common platform that our Society offers to all to stand upon; the most fundamental differences between religions and sects sinking into insignificance before the mighty problem of reconciling humanity, of gathering all the various races into one family, and of bringing them all to a conviction of the utmost necessity in this world of sorrow to cultivate feelings of brotherly sympathy and tolerance, if not actually of love. Having taken for our motto—“In these Fundamentals—unity; in non-essentials—full liberty; in all things—charity,” we say to all collectively and to every one individually—“keep to your forefather’s
religion, whatever it may be—if you feel attached to it, Brother; think with your own brains—if you have any; be by all means yourself—whatever you are, unless you are really a bad man. And remember above all, that a wolf in his own skin is immeasurably more honest than the same animal—under a sheep’s clothing.”

Lucifer, December, 1887

EDITORIAL COMMENT

W e have received several communications for publication, bearing on the subjects discussed in the editorial of our last issue, “Let every man prove his own work.” A few brief remarks may be made, not in reply to any of the letters— which, being anonymous, and containing no card from the writers, cannot be published (nor are such noticed, as a general rule)—but to the ideas and accusations contained in one of them, a letter signed “M.” Its author takes up the cudgels on behalf of the Church. He objects to the statement that this institution lacks the enlightenment necessary to carry out a true system of philanthropy. He appears, also, to demur to the view that “the practical people either go on doing good unintentionally and often do harm,” and points to the workers amid our slums as a vindication of Christianity—which, by-the-bye, was in no sense attacked in the editorial so criticized.

To this, repeating what was said, we maintain that more mischief has been done by emotional charity than sentimentalists care to face. Any student of political economy is familiar with this fact, which passes for a truism with all those who have devoted attention to the problem. No nobler sentiment than that which animates the unselfish philanthropist is conceivable; but the question at issue is not summed up in the recognition of this truth. The practical results of his labours have to be examined. We have to see whether he does not sow the seeds of a greater—while relieving a lesser—evil.

The fact that “thousands are making great efforts in all the cities throughout our land” to meet want, reflects immense credit on the character of such workers. It does not affect their creed, for such natures would remain the same, whatever the prevailing dogmas chanced to be. It is certainly a very poor illustration of the fruits of
centuries of dogmatic Christianity that England should be so honeycombed with misery and poverty as she is—especially on the biblical ground that a tree must be judged by its fruits! It might, also, be argued, that the past history of the Churches, stained as it is with persecutions, the suppression of knowledge, crime and brutality, necessitates the turning over of a new leaf. The difficulties in the way are insuperable. “Churchianity” has, indeed, done its best to keep up with the age by assimilating the teachings of, and making veiled truces with, science, but it is incapable of affording a true spiritual ideal to the world.

The same Church-Christianity assails with fruitless pertinacity, the ever-growing host of Agnostics and Materialists, but is as absolutely ignorant, as the latter, of the mysteries beyond the tomb. The great necessity for the Church, according to Professor Flint, is to keep the leaders of European thought within its fold. By such men it is, however, regarded as an anachronism. The Church is eaten up with scepticism within its own walls; free-thinking clergymen being now very common. This constant drain of vitality has reduced the true religion to a very low ebb, and it is to infuse a new current of ideas and aspirations into modern thought, in short, to supply a logical basis for an elevated morality, a science and philosophy which is suited to the knowledge of the day, that Theosophy comes before the world. Mere physical philanthropy, apart from the infusion of new influences and ennobling conceptions of life into the minds of the masses, is worthless. The gradual assimilation by mankind of great spiritual truths will alone revolutionize the face of civilization, and ultimately result in a far more effective panacea for evil, than the mere tinkering of superficial misery. Prevention is better than cure. Society creates its own outcasts, criminals, and profligates, and then condemns and punishes its own Frankenstein, sentencing its own progeny, the “bone of its bone, and the flesh of its flesh,” to a life of damnation on earth. Yet that society recognises and enforces most hypocritically Christianity—i.e., “Churchianity.” Shall we then, or shall we not, infer that the latter is unequal to the requirements of mankind? Evidently the former, and most painfully and obviously so, in its present dogmatic form, which makes of the beautiful ethics preached on the Mount, a Dead Sea fruit, a whitened sepulchre, and no better.

Furthermore, the same “M,” alluding to Jesus as one with regard to whom there could be only two alternatives, writes that he “was either the Son of God or the vilest imposter who ever trod this earth.” We answer, not at all. Whether the Jesus of the New Testament ever lived or not, whether he existed as an historical personage, or was simply a lay figure around which the Bible allegories clustered—the Jesus of Nazareth of Matthew and John, is the ideal for every would-be sage and Western candidate Theosophist to follow. That such an one as he, was a “Son of God,” is as undeniable as that he was neither the only “Son of God,” nor the first one, nor even the last who closed the series of the “Sons of God,” or children of Divine Wisdom, on this earth. Nor is it other statement that in “His life he (Jesus) has ever spoken of himself as co-existent with Jehovah, the Supreme, the Centre of the Universe,” correct, whether in its dead letter, or hidden mystic sense. In no place does Jesus ever allude to “Jehovah”; but, on the contrary, attacking the Mosaic laws and the alleged Commandments given on Mount Sinai, he disconnects himself and his “Father” most distinctly and emphatically from the Sinaic tribal God. The whole of Chapter V., in the Gospel of Matthew, is a passionate protest of the “man of peace, love and charity,” against the cruel, stern, and selfish commandments of “the man of war,” the “Lord” of Moses (Exod. xv., 3) “Ye have heard that it was said by them of old times,”—so and so—“But I say unto you,” quite the reverse. Christians who still hold to the Old Testament and the Jehovah of the Israelites, are at best schismatic Jews. Let them be that, by all means, if they will so have it; but they have no right to call themselves even Christians, let alone Christians.¹

It is a gross injustice and untruth to assert, as our anonymous correspondent does, that “the freethinkers are notoriously unholy in their lives.” Some of the noblest characters, as well as deepest thinkers of the day, adorn the ranks of Agnosticism, Positivism and Materialism. The latter are the worst enemies of Theosophy and Mysticism; but this is no reason why strict justice should not be done unto them.

¹ See “The Esoteric Character of the Gospels,” in this number. [Lucifer, December, 1887. Revision in the pamphlet of the same title.]
Colonel Ingersoll, a rank materialist, and the leader of freethought in America, is recognised, even by his enemies, as an ideal husband, father, friend and citizen, one of the noblest characters that grace the United States. Count Tolstoi is a freethinker who has long parted with the orthodox Church, yet his whole life is an exemplar of Christ-like altruism and self-sacrifice. Would to goodness every “Christian” should take those two “infidels” as his models in private and public life. The munificence of many freethinking philanthropists stands out in startling contrast with the apathy of the monied dignitaries of the Church. The above fling at the “enemies of the Church,” is as absurd as it is contemptible.

“What can you offer to the dying woman who fears to tread alone the dark unknown?” we are asked. Our Christian critic here frankly confesses (a.) that Christian dogmas have only developed fear of death, and (b.) the agnosticism of the orthodox believer in Christian theology as to the future post-mortem state. It is, indeed, difficult to appreciate the peculiar type of bliss which orthodoxy offers its believers in—damnation.

The dying man—the average Christian—with a dark retrospect in life can scarcely appreciate this boon; while the Calvinist or the Predestinarian, who is brought up in the idea that God may have pre-assigned him from eternity to everlasting misery, through no fault of that man, but simply because he is God, is more than justified in regarding the latter as ten times worse than any devil or fiend that unclean human fancy could evolve.

Theosophy, on the contrary, teaches that perfect, absolute justice reigns in nature, though short-sighted man fails to see it in its details on the material and even psychic plane, and that every man determines his own future. The true Hell is life on Earth, as an effect of Karmic punishment following the preceding life during which the evil causes were produced. The Theosophist fears no hell, but confidently expects rest and bliss during the interim between two incarnations, as a reward for all the unmerited suffering he has endured in an existence into which he was ushered by Karma, and during which he is, in most cases, as helpless as a torn-off leaf whirled about by the conflicting winds of social and private life. Enough has been given out at various times regarding the conditions of post-mortem existence, to furnish a solid block of information on this point. Christian theology has nothing to say on this burning question, except where it veils its ignorance by mystery and dogma; but Occultism, unveiling the symbology of the Bible, explains it thoroughly.—[Ed. Lucifer.]
THEOSOPHY OR JESUITISM?

“Choose you this day whom ye will serve; whether the gods which your fathers served that were on the other side of the flood, or the gods of the Amorites.”—Joshua, xxiv., 15

The thirteenth number of Le Lotus, the recognised organ of Theosophy, among many articles of undeniable interest, contains one by Madame Blavatsky in reply to the Abbe Roca. The eminent writer, who is certainly the most learned woman of pur acquaintance,1 discusses the following question: “Has Jesus ever existed?” She destroys the Christian legend, in its details, at least, with irrecusable texts which are not usually consulted by religious historians.

This article is producing a profound sensation in the Catholic and Judeo-Catholic swamp: we are not surprised at this, for the author’s arguments are such as it is difficult to break down, even were one accustomed to the Byzantine disputes of theology.—Paris, Evening paper, of May 12, 1888.

The series of articles, one of which is referred to in the above quotation from a well-known French evening paper, was originally called forth by an article in Le Lotus by the Abbe Roca, a translation of which was published in the January number of Lucifer.

These articles, it would seem, have stirred up many slumbering animosities. They appear, in particular, to have touched the Jesuit party in France somewhat nearly. Several correspondents have written calling attention to the danger incurred by Theosophists in raising up against themselves such virulent and powerful foes. Some of our friends would have us keep silent on these topics. Such is not, however, the policy of Lucifer, nor ever will be. Therefore, the present opportunity is taken to state, once for all, the views which Theosophists and Occultists entertain with regard to the Society of Jesus. At the same time, all those who are pursuing in life’s great wilderness of vain evanescent pleasures and empty conventionalities an ideal worth living for, are offered the choice between the two now once more rising powers—the Alpha and the Omega at the two opposite ends of the realm of giddy, idle existence—Theosophy and Jesuitism.

For, in the field of religious and intellectual pursuits, these two are the only luminaries—a good and an evil star, truly—glimmering once more from behind the mists of the Past, and ascending on the horizon of mental activities. They are the only two powers capable in the present day of extricating one thirsty for intellectual life from the clammy slush of the stagnant pool known as Modern Society, so crystallized in its cant, so dreary and monotonous in its squirrel-like motion around the wheel of fashion. Theosophy and Jesuitism are the two opposite poles, one far above, the other far below even that stagnant marsh. Both offer power—one to the spiritual, the other to the psychic and intellectual Ego in man. The former is “the wisdom that is from above . . . pure, peaceable, gentle . . . full of mercy and good fruits, without partiality and without hypocrisy,” while the latter is “the wisdom that descendeth not from above, but is earthly, sensual, Devilish.” One is the power of Light, the other that of Darkness.

A question will surely be asked: “Why should anyone choose between the two? Cannot one remain in the world, a good Christian of whatever church, without gravitating to either of these poles?” Most undeniably, one can do so, for a few more years to come. But the cycle is rapidly approaching the last limit of its turning point. One out of the three great churches of Christendom is split into atomic sects, whose number increases yearly; and a house divided against itself, as is the Protestant Church—MUST FALL. The third, the Roman Catholic, the only one that has hitherto succeeded in appearing to

1 The humble individual of that name renders thanks to the editor of Paris: not so much for the flattering opinion expressed as for the rare surprise to find the name of “Blavatsky.” for once, neither preceded nor followed by any of the usual abusive epithets and adjectives which the highly cultured English and American newspapers and their gentlemanly editors are so fond of coupling with the said cognomen—[Ed.]

2 The question is rather: Did the “historical” Jesus ever exist?—[Ed.]

3 James’ General Epistle, chapter iii, 15, 17.
retain all its integrity, is rapidly decaying from within. It is honeycombed throughout, and is being devoured by the ravenous microbes begotten by Loyola.

It is no better now than a Dead Sea fruit, fair for some to look at, but full of the rottenness of decay and death within. Roman Catholicism is but a name. As a Church it is a phantom of the Past and a mask. It is absolutely and indissolubly bound up with, and fettered by the Society of Ignatius Loyola; for, as rightly expressed by Lord Robert Montagu, “The Roman Catholic Church is (now) the largest Secret Society in the world, beside which Freemasonry is but a pigmy.” Protestantism is slowly, insidiously, but as surely, infected with Latinism—the new ritualistic sects of the High Church, and such men among its clergy as Father Revington, being undeniable evidence of it. In thirty years more at the present rate of success of Latinism among the “upper ten,” the English aristocracy will have returned to the faith of King Charles II, and its servile copyist—mixed Society—will have followed suit. And then the Jesuits will begin to reign alone and supreme over the Christian portions of the globe, for they have crept even into the Greek Church.

It is vain to argue and claim a difference between Jesuitism and Roman Catholicism proper, for the latter is now sucked into and inseparably amalgamated with the former. We have public assurance for it in the pastoral of 1876 by the Bishop of Cambrai. “Clericalism, XJltr amonidnism and Jesuitism are one and the same thing—that is to say, Roman Catholicism—and the distinctions between them have been created by the enemies of religion,” says the “Pastoral.” “There was a time,” adds Monseigneur the Cardinal, “when a certain theological opinion was commonly professed in France concerning the authority of the Pope. ... It was restricted to our nation, and was of recent origin. The civil power during a century and a half imposed official instruction. Those who professed these opinions were called Gallicans, and those who protested were called Ultramontanes, because they had their doctrinal centre beyond the Alps, at Rome. Today the distinction between the two schools is no longer admissible. Theological Gal-licanism can no longer exist, since this opinion has ceased to be tolerated by the Church. It has been solemnly condemned, past all return, by the (Ecumenical Council of the Vatican. ONE CANNOT now be a Catholic without being Ultramontane—and Jesuits.”

A plain statement; and as cool as it is plain.

The pastoral made a certain noise in France and in the Catholic world, but was soon forgotten. And as two centuries have rolled away since an expose of the infamous principles of the Jesuits was made (of which we will speak presently), the “Black Militia” of Loyola has had ample time to lie so successfully in denying the just charges, that even now, when the present Pope has brilliantly sanctioned the utterance of the Bishop of Cambrai, the Roman Catholics will hardly confess to such a thing. Strange exhibition of infallibility in the Popes! The “infallible” Pope, Clement XIV (Ganganelli), suppressed the Jesuits on the 23rd of July, 1773, and yet they came to life again; the “infallible” Pope, Pius VII, re-established them on the 7th of August, 1814. The “infallible” Pope, Pius IX,travelled, during the whole of his long Pontificate, between the Scylla and Charybdis of the Jesuit question; his infallibility helping him very little. And now the “infallible” Leo XIII (fatal figures!) raises the Jesuits again to the highest pinnacle of their sinister and graceless glory.

The recent Brevet of the Pope (hardly two years old) dated July 13th (the same fatal figure), 1886, is an event, the importance of which can never be overvalued. It begins with the words Dolemns inter alia, and reinstalls the Jesuits in all the rights of the Order that had ever been cancelled. It was a manifesto and a loud defiant insult to all the Christian nations of the New and the Old worlds. From an article by Louis Lambert in the Gaulois (August 18th, 1886) we learn that “In 1750 there were 40,000 Jesuits all over the world. In 1800, officially they were reckoned at about 1,000 men, only In 1886, they numbered between 7 and 8,000.” This last modest number can well be doubted. For verily now—“Where you meet a man believing in the salutary nature of falsehoods, or the divine authority of things doubtful, and fancying that to serve the good cause he must call the devil to his aid, there is a follower of Unsaint Ignatius,” says Carlyle, and adds of that black militia of Ignatius that: “They have given a new
substantive to modern languages. The word Jesuitism now, in all
countries, expresses an idea for which there was in nature no prototype
before. Not till these last centuries had the human soul generated that
abomination, or needed to name it. Truly they have achieved great
things in the world, and a general result that we may call stupendous.”

And now since their reinstallment in Germany and elsewhere,
they will achieve still grander and more stupendous results. For the
future can be best read by the past. Unfortunately in this year of the
Pope’s Jubilee the civilized portions of humanity—even the Protestant
ones—seem to have entirely forgotten that past. Let then those who
profess to despise Theosophy, the fair child of early Aryan thought
and Alexandrian Neo-Platonism, bow before the monstrous Fiend of
the Age, but let them not forget at the same time its history

It is curious to observe, how persistently the Order has assailed
everything like Occultism from the earliest times, and Theosophy since
the foundation of its last Society, which is ours. The Moors and the
Jews of Spain felt the weight of the oppressive hand of Obscurantism
no less than did the Kabalists and Alchemists of the Middle Ages.
One would think Esoteric philosophy and especially the Occult Arts,
or Magic, were an abomination to these good holy fathers? And so
indeed they would have the world believe. But when one studies
history and the works of their own authors published with the
imprimatur of the Order, what does one find? That the Jesuits have
practised not only Occultism, but BLACK MAGIC in its worst form,
more than any other body of men; and that to it they owe in large
measure their power and influence!

To refresh the memory of our readers and all those whom it may
concern, a short summary of the doings and acts of our good
friends, may be once more attempted. For those who are inclined to
laugh, and deny the subterranean and truly infernal means used by
“Ignatius’ black militia,” we may state facts.

In “Isis Unveiled” it was said of this holy Fraternity that—

“though established only in 1535 to 1540—in 1555 there was already
a general outcry raised against them.” And now once more—

4 Mesmerism or HYMNOSM is a prominent factor in Occultism. It is magic. The Jesuits were
acquainted with and practised it ages before Mesmer and Charcot.—[Ed.]

“That crafty, learned, conscienceless, terrible soul of Jesuitism, within
the body of Romanism, is slowly but surely possessing itself of the whole
prestige and spiritual power that clings to it. . . . Throughout antiquity,
where, in what land, can we find anything like this Order or anything even
approaching it? . . . The cry of an outraged public morality was raised
against it from its very birth. Barely fifteen years had elapsed after the bull
approving its constitution was promulgated, when its members began to be
driven away from one place to the other. Portugal and the Low Countries
got rid of them, in 1578; France in 1594; Venice in 1606; Naples in 1622.
From St. Petersburg they were expelled in 1815, and from all Russia in
1820.”

The writer begs to remark to the readers, that this, which was
written in 1875, applies admirably and with still more force in 1888.
Also that the statements that follow in quotation marks may be all
verified. And thirdly, that the principles (principii) of the Jesuits that
are now brought forward, are extracted from authenticated MSS. or
folios printed by various members themselves of this very distinguished
body. Therefore, they can be checked and verified in the “British
Museum” and Bodleian Library with still more ease than in our works.

Many are copied from the large Quarto published by the authority
of, and verified and collated by, the Commissioners of the French Parliament.
The statements therein were collected and presented to the King, in order
that, as the “Arret du Parle-ment du 5 Mars, 1762,” expresses it, “the elder
son of the Church might be made aware of the perversity of this doctrine.
... A doctrine authorizing Theft, Lying, Perjury, Impurity, every Passion
and Crime; teaching Homicide, Parricide, and Regicide, overthrowing religion
in order to substitute for it superstition, by favoring Sorcery, Blasphemy,
Irreligion, and Idolatry . . . etc.” Let us then examine the ideas on magic of
The Jesuits, that magic which they are pleased to call devilish and Satanic
when studied by the Theosophists. Writing on this subject in his secret
instructions, Anthony Escobar says:

“It is lawful . . . to make use of the science acquired through the
assistance of the devil, provided the preservation and use of that knowledge
do not depend upon the devil, for the knowledge is good in itself, and the
sin by which it was acquired has gone by.”

5 Extracts from this “Arret” were compiled into a work in 4 vols., 12mo., which appeared at Paris,
in 1762, and was known as “Extraits des Assertions, etc.” In a work entitled “Response aux Assertions,” an
attempt was made by the Jesuits to throw discredit upon the facts collected by the Commissioners of the
French Parliament in 1762, as for the most part malicious fabrications. “To ascertain the validity of this
impeachment,” says the author of “The Principles of the Jesuits,” “the libraries of the two Universities, of the
British Museum and of Sion College have been searched for the authors cited; and in every instance where
the volume was found, the correctness of the citation was established.”

6 “Theologiae Moralis” Tomus iv. Lugduni, 1663.

7 Tom. iv. lib. xxviii., sect. i, de Praecept, l. c. 20, n. 194.
True: why should not a Jesuit cheat the Devil as well as he cheats every layman?

"Astrologers and soothsayers are either bound, or are not bound, to restore the reward of their divination, if the event does not come to pass. I own," remarks the good Father Escobar, "that the former opinion does not at all please me, because, when the astrologer or diviner has exerted all the diligence in the diabolical art which is essential to his purpose, he has fulfilled his duty, whatever may be the result. As the physician ... is not bound to restore his fee ... if his \ patient should die; so neither is the astrologer bound to restore his charge ... except where he has used no effort, or was ignorant of his diabolic art; because, when he has used his endeavors he has not deceived."

Bussembaum and Lacroix, in "Theologia Moralis," say,

"Palmistry may be considered lawful, if from the lines and divisions of the hands it can ascertain the disposition of the body, and conjecture, with probability, the propensities and affections of the soul."

This noble fraternity, which many preachers have of late so vehemently denied to have ever been a secret one, has been sufficiently proved to be such. Its constitutions were translated into Latin by the Jesuit Polancus, and printed in the college of the Society at Rome, in 1558. "They were jealously kept secret, the greater part of the Jesuits themselves knowing only extracts from them. They were never produced to light until 1761, when they were published by order of the French Parliament in 1761, 1762, in the famous process of Father Lavalette." The Jesuits reckon it among the greatest achievements of their Order that Loyola supported, by a special memorial to the Pope, a petition for the reorganization of that abominable and abhorred instrument of wholesale butchery—the infamous tribunal of the Inquisition.

This Order of Jesuits is now all-powerful in Rome. They have been reinstalled in the Congregation of Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs, in the Department of the Secretary of the State, and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Pontifical Government was for years previous to Victor Emanuel's occupation of Rome entirely in their hands. . . . —Isis, vol. II, p. 355, et seq. 1876.

8 Ibid., sect. 2, de Praecept I, Probl. 113, n. 586.
9 "Theologia Moralis nunc pluribus paritibus aucta, a R. P. Claudio Lacroix, Societatis Jesu." Coloniae, 1757 (Ed. Mus. Brit.).
10 Tom., ii., lib. iii., Pars, i. Fr. i. c. i. dub. 2 resol. vii. What a pity that the counsel for the defence had not bethought them to cite this orthodox legalization of "cheating by palmistry or otherwise," at the recent religo-scientific prosecution of the medium Slade, in London.
11 Niccolini: "History of the Jesuits."

What was the origin of that order? It may be stated in a few words. In the year 1534, on August 16th, an ex-officer and "Knight of the Virgin," from the Biscayan Provinces, and the proprietor of the magnificent castle of Casa Solar—Ignatius Loyola, became the hero of the following incident. In the subterranean chapel of the Church of Montmartre, surrounded by a few priests and students of theology, he received their pledges to devote their whole lives to the spreading of Roman Catholicism by every and all means, whether good or foul; and he was thus enabled to establish a new Order. Loyola proposed to his six chief companions that their Order should be a militant one, in order to fight for the interests of the Holy seat of Roman Catholicism. Two means were adopted to make the object answer; the education of youth, and proselytism (apostolat). This was during the reign of Pope Paul III, who gave his full sympathy to the new scheme. Hence in 1540 was published the famous papal bull—Regimini militantis Ecclesice (the regiment of the warring, or militant Church)—after which the Order began increasing rapidly in numbers and power.

At the death of Loyola, the society counted more than one thousand Jesuits, though admission into the ranks was, as alleged, surrounded with extraordinary difficulties. It was another celebrated and unprecedented bull, issued by Pope Julius the III in 1552, that brought the Order of Jesus to such eminence and helped it towards such rapid increase; for it placed the society outside and beyond the jurisdiction of local ecclesiastical authority, granted the Order its own laws, and permitted it to recognize but one supreme authority—that of its General, whose residence was then at Rome. The results of such an arrangement proved fatal to the Secular Church. High prelates and Cardinals had very often to tremble before a simple subordinate of the Society of Jesus. Its generals always got the upper hand in Rome, and enjoyed the unlimited confidence of the Popes, who thus frequently became tools in the hands of the Order. Naturally enough, in those days when political power was one of the rights of the "Vice-gerents of God"—the strength of the crafty society became simply

12 Or "St. Inigo the Biscayan" by his true name.
tremendous. In the name of the Popes, the Jesuits thus granted to themselves unheard-of-privileges, which they enjoyed unstintedly up to the year 1772. In that year, Pope Clement XIV published a new bull, *Dominus ac Redemptor* (the Lord and Redeemer), abolishing the famous Order. But the Popes proved helpless before this new Frankenstein, the fiend that one of the “Vicars of God” had evoked. The society continued its existence secretly, notwithstanding the persecutions of both Popes and the lay authorities of every country. In 1801, under the new *alias* of the “Congregation of the Sacre Coeur de Jesus,” it had already penetrated into and was tolerated in Russia and Sicily.

In 1814, as already said, a new bull of Pius VII resurrected the Order of Jesus, though its late privileges, even those among the lay clergy, were withheld from it. The lay authorities, in France as elsewhere, have found themselves compelled ever since to tolerate and to count with Jesuits. All that they could do was to deny them any special privileges and subject the members of that society to the laws of the country, equally with other ecclesiastics. But, gradually and imperceptibly the Jesuits succeeded in obtaining special favours even from the lay authorities Napoleon III granted them permission to open seven colleges in Paris only, for the education of the young, the only condition exacted being, that those colleges should be under the authority and supervision of local bishops. But the establishments had hardly been opened when the Jesuits broke that rule. The episode with the Archbishop Dar-boy is well known. Desiring to visit this Jesuit college in the Rue de la Poste (Paris), he was refused admittance, and the gates were closed against him by order of the Superior. The Bishop lodged a complaint at the Vatican. But the answer was delayed for such a length of time, that the Jesuits remained virtually masters of the situation and outside of every jurisdiction but their own.

And now read what Lord R. Montagu says of their deeds in Protestant England, and judge:

The Jesuit Society—with its Nihilist adherents in Russia, its Socialist allies in Germany, its Fenians and Nationalists in Ireland, its accomplices and slaves in its power, think of that Society which has not scrupled to stir up the most bloody wars between nations, in order to advance its purposes; and yet can stoop to hunting down a single man because he knows their secret and will not be its slave... think of a Society which can devise such a diabolical scheme and then boast of it; and say whether a desperate energy is not required in us?... If you have been behind the scenes... then you would still have before you the labour of unravelling all that is being done by our Government and of tearing off the tissue of lies by which their acts are concealed. Repeated attempts will have taught you that there is not a public man on whom you can lean. Because as England is ‘between the upper and nether millstone,’ none but adherents or slaves are now advanced; and it stands to reason that the Jesuits, who have got that far, have prepared new millstones for the time when the present ones shall have passed away; and then again, younger millstones to come on after... and wield the power of the nation.—("Recent Events and a Clue to their Solution," Page 76.)

In France the affairs of the sons of Loyola flourished to the day when the ministry of Jules Ferry compelled them to retire from the field of battle. Many are those who still remember the useless strictness of the police measures, and the clever enacting of dramatic scenes by the Jesuits themselves. This only added to their popularity with certain classes. They obtained thereby an aureole of martyrdom, and the sympathy of every pious and foolish woman in the land was secured to them.

And now that Pope Leo XIII has once more restored to the good fathers, the Jesuits, all the privileges and rights that had ever been granted to their predecessors, what can the public at large of Europe and America expect? Judging by the *bull*, the complete mastery, moral and physical, over every land where there are Roman Catholics, is secured to the Black Militia. For in this bull the Pope confesses that of all the religious congregations now existing, *that of the Jesuits is the one dearest to his heart*. He lacks words sufficiently expressive to show the ardent love he (Pope Leo) feels for them, etc., etc. Thus they have the certitude of the support of the Vatican in all and everything. And as it is they who guide him, we see his Holiness coquetting and flirting with every great European potentate—from Bismarck down to the crowned heads of Continent and Isle. In view of the ever increasing influence of Leo XIII, moral and political—such a certitude for the Jesuits is of no mean importance.

For minute particulars the reader is referred to such well-known authors as Lord Robert Montagu in England; and on the Continent,

Meanwhile, let us remember the words of warning we received from one of our late Theosophists, Dr. Kenneth Mackenzie, who, speaking of the Jesuits, says that:—

“Their spies are everywhere, of all apparent ranks of society, and they may appear learned and wise, or simple or foolish, as their instructions run. There are Jesuits of both sexes, and all ages, and it is a well-known fact that members of the Order, of high family and delicate nurture, are acting as menial servants in Protestant families, and doing other things of a similar nature in aid of the Society’s purposes. We cannot be too much on our guard, for the whole Society, being founded on a law of unhesitating obedience, can bring its force to bear on any given point with unerring and fatal accuracy.”\footnote{13 "Royal Masonic Cyclopaedia," p. 369.}

The Jesuits maintain that “the Society of Jesus is not of human invention, but it proceeded from him whose name it bears. For Jesus himself described that rule of life which the Society follows, \textit{first by his example, and afterwards by his words.}”\footnote{14 Imago: "Primi Saeculi Societatis Jesu," lib. I, c. 3, p. 64.}

Let, then, all pious Christians listen and acquaint themselves with this alleged “rule of life” and precepts of their God, as exemplified by the Jesuits. Peter Alagona (\textit{St. Thomae Aquinatis Summce Theologice Compendium}) says: “By the command of God it is lawful to kill an innocent person, to steal, or commit . . . (Ex mandato Dei licet occidere innocentem, furari, fornicari); because he is the Lord of life and death, and all things, and it is due to him thus to fulfill his command” (Ex prim & secundae, Quaest., 94).

“A man of a religious order, who for a short time lays aside his habit for a sinful purpose, is free from heinous sin, and does not incur the penalty of excommunication.” (Lib. iii, sec. 2, Probl. 44, n. 212).\footnote{15 Anthony Escobar: "Universae absque lite sententiae," Theologiae Moralis receptiore. etc., Tom us i, Lugduni, 1652 (Ed. Bibl. Acad. Cant.), "idem sentio, e breve illud tern-pus ad unius horae spatium traho. Religiosus itaque habitum demittens assignato hoc temporis intersittio, non incurrit excommunicationem, etiam si dimittat non solum ex causa turpi, scilicet fornicandi, aut clam aliquid abripiendi, set etiam ut incognitus ineat lupanar." Probl. 44, n. 213.}

John Baptist Taberna (\textit{Synopsis Theologice Practices} (propounds the following question: “Is a judge bound to restore the bribe which he has received from passing sentence?” Answer: “If he has received the bribe for passing an unjust sentence, it is probable that he may keep it . . . This opinion is maintained and defended by fifty-eight doctors” (Jesuits).\footnote{16 Pars. II, Tra. 2, c. 31.}

We must abstain at present from proceeding further. So disgustingly licentious, hypocritical, and demoralizing are nearly all of these precepts, that it was found impossible to put many of them in print, except in the Latin language.\footnote{17 See "Principles of the Jesuits developed in a Collection of Extracts from their own authors." London. 1839.}

But what are we to think of the future of Society if it is to be controlled in word and deed by this villainous Body! What are we to expect from a public, which, knowing the existence of the above mentioned charges, and that they are not exaggerated \textit{but pertain to historical fact}, still tolerates, when it does not reverence, the Jesuits on meeting them, while it is ever ready to point the finger of contempt at Theosophists and Occultists? Theosophy is persecuted with unmerited slander and ridicule at the instigation of these same Jesuits, and many are those who hardly dare to confess their belief in the Philosophy of Arhatship. Yet no Theosophical Society has ever threatened the public with moral decay and the full and free exercise of the seven capital sins under the mask of holiness and the guidance of Jesus! Nor are their rules \textit{secret}, but open to all, for they live in the broad daylight of truth and sincerity. And how about the Jesuits in this respect?

“Jesuits who belong to the highest category,” says again Louis Lambert, “have full and absolute liberty of action—even to murder and arson. On the other hand, those Jesuits who are found guilty of the slightest attempt to endanger or compromise the Society of Jesus—\textit{are punished mercilessly.} They are allowed to write the most heretical books, provided they do not \textit{expose} the secrets of the Order.”

And these “secrets” are undeniably of a most terrible and dangerous nature. Compare a few of these \textit{Christian precepts} and rules for entering this Society of \textit{divine origin}, as claimed for it, with the laws that regulated admissions to the secret societies (temple mysteries) of the Pagans.
“A brother Jesuit has the right to kill anyone that may prove dangerous to Jesuitism.”

“Christian and Catholic sons,” says Stephen Fagundez, “may accuse their fathers of the crime of heresy if they wish to turn them from the faith, although they may know that their parents will be burned with fire, and put to death for it, as Tolet teaches . . . And not only may they refuse them food, . . . but they may also justly kill them.”

It is well known that Nero, the Emperor, had never dared seek initiation into the pagan Mysteries on account of the murder of Agrippina!

Under Section XIV of the Principles of the Jesuits, we find on Homicide the following Christian ethics inculcated by Father Henry Henriquez, in Summcte Theologice Moralis, Tomus I, Venetii, 1600 (Ed. Coll. Sion): “If an adulterer, even though he should be an ecclesiastic . . . being attacked by the husband, kills his aggressor . . . he is not considered irregular: nonridoetur irregularis (Lib. XIV’, de Irregularite, c. 10, § 3).

“If a father were obnoxious to the State (being in banishment), and to the society at large, and there were no other means of averting such an injury, then 1 should approve of this” for a son to kill his father), says Sec. XV, on Parricide and Homicide.19

“It will be lawful for an ecclesiastic, or one of the religious order, to kill a calumniator who threatens to spread atrocious accusations against himself or his religion,”20 is the rule set forth by the Jesuit Francis Amicus.

One of the most unconquerable obstacles to initiation, with the Egyptians as with the Greeks, was any degree of murder, or even of simple unchastity.

It is these “enemies of the Human Race,” as they are called, that have oncemore obtained their old privileges of working in the dark, and inveigling and destroying every obstacle they find in their way—with absolute impunity. But—“forewarned,forearmed.” Students of Occultism should know that, while the Jesuits have, by their devices, contrived to make the world in general, and Englishmen in particular, think there is no such thing as MAGIC, these astute and wily schemers themselves hold magnetic circles, and form magnetic chains by the concentration of their collective will, when they have any special object to affect, or any particular and important person to influence. Again, they use their riches lavishly to help them in any project. Their wealth is enormous. When recently expelled from France, they brought so much money with them, some part of which they converted into English Funds, that immediately the latter were raised to par, which the Daily Telegraph pointed out at the time.

They have succeeded. The Church is henceforth an inert tool, and the Pope a poor weak instrument in the hands of this Order. But for how long? The day may come when their wealth will be violently taken from them, and they themselves mercilessly destroyed amidst the general execrations and applause of all nations and peoples. There is a Nemesis—KARMA, though often it allows Evil and Sin to go on successfully for ages. It is also a vain attempt on their part to threaten the Theosophists—their implacable enemies. For the latter are, perhaps, the only body in the whole world who need not fear them. They may try, and perhaps succeed, in crushing individual members. They would vainly try their hand, strong and powerful as it may be, in an attack on the Society. Theosophists are as well protected, and better, than themselves.

To the man of modern science, to all those who know nothing, and who do not believe what they hear of WHITE and BLACK magic, the above will read like nonsense. Let it be, though Europe will very soon experience, and is already so experiencing, the heavy hand of the latter.

Theosophists are slandered and reviled by the Jesuits and their adherents everywhere. They are charged with idolatry and superstition; and yet we read in the same “Principles” of the Father Jesuits:—

“The more true opinion is, that all inanimate and irrational things may be legitimately worshipped,” says Father Gabriel Vasquez, treating of Idolatry. “If the doctrine which we have established be rightly understood, not only may a painted image and every holy thing, set forth by public authority, be properly adored with God as the image of Himself, but also any other thing of this world, whether it be inanimate and irrational, or in its nature rational.”21

This is Roman Catholicism, identical and henceforth one with Jesuitism—as shown by the pastoral of the Cardinal Bishop of
Cambrai, and Pope Leo. A precept this, which, whether or not doing honour to the Christian Church, may at least be profitably quoted by any Hindu, Japanese, or any other “heathen” Theosophist, who has not yet given up the belief of his childhood.

But we must close. There is a prophecy in the heathen East about the Christian West, which, when rendered into comprehensible English, reads thus: “When the conquerors of all the ancient nations are in their turn conquered by an army of black dragons begotten by their sins and born of decay, then the hour of liberation for the former will strike.” Easy to see who are the “black dragons.” And these will in their turn see their power arrested and forcibly put to an end by the liberated legions. Then, perhaps, there will be a new invasion of an Atilla from the far East. One day the millions of China and Mongolia, heathen and Mussulman, furnished with every murderous weapon invented by civilization, and forced upon the Celestial of the East, by the infernal spirit of trade and love of lucre of the West, drilled, moreover, to perfection by Christian man-slayers—will pour into and invade decaying Europe like an irrepressible torrent. This will be the result of the work of the Jesuits, who will be its first victims, let us hope—

—H. P. Blavatsky

Lucifer, September, 1890

LEO TOLSTOI AND HIS UNECCLESIASTICAL CHRISTIANITY

TOLSTOI is a great poet, a great artist, a great thinker. All through his life, both heart and mind have been occupied by one burning question, coloring more or less with its painful pressure all his works. We feel its overshadowing presence in the “History of my Childhood,” in “War and Peace,” in “Anna Karenina,” till at last it becomes the exclusive pre-occupation of his later years, which have produced such works as “My Confession,” “In what does my Faith Consist?,” “What shall we Do?,” “Upon Life,” and the “Kreutzer Sonata.” This same question burns in the hearts of many, especially among Theosophists; it is indeed the question of life itself. “What is the meaning, the purpose of human life? What is the final outcome of the unnatural, distorted and falsified life of our civilisation, such as it is forced upon each of us individually? What shall we do to be happy, permanently happy? How shall man escape the horror of inevitable death?” To these ever recurring questions, Tolstoi, in his earlier works, gives no answer because he had found none himself. But he could not rest contented, as do millions of others, weaker or more cowardly natures, without an answer, one at least satisfying to his own heart and intellect; and in the five last-named works is contained that answer. An answer, it is true, that will not content the Theosophist in the form in which Tolstoi gives it, but an answer in whose basic, vital thought he may find new light, fresh hope, stronger comfort. But to understand it, we must briefly trace the road by which Tolstoi reached the peace he has found; for unless we can, as well as understand the inner process which led him thither, his solution, like every other solution of life’s problem, must remain a dead letter, a merely intellectual word-conception, lacking all vital force and motive
power; a mere speculation, not a living truth instinct with enthusiasm. Like all thinking men and women of to-day, Tolstoi lost faith in religion early in life; for this loss of one’s childish faith—inevitable in every life—is not, as a rule, the result of deep thought; it is rather the natural consequence of our culture and of our general experience of life. As he says himself, his faith vanished, he knew not how. But his youthful striving after ethical perfection survived for some ten years, to die out by degrees, finally disappearing utterly. Seeing everywhere around him ambition, love of power, selfishness and sensuality triumphant; seeing all that is called virtue, goodness, purity, altruism, scorned and flouted, failing to give either inward happiness and content or outward success; Tolstoi went the way of the world, did as he saw others do, practising all the vices and meannesses of the “polite world.” Then he turned to literature, became a great poet, a most successful author, seeking ever, he tells us, to hide his own ignorance from himself by teaching others. For some years he succeeded in thus stifling his inner discontent, but ever more frequently, more poignantly, the question forced itself upon him: What am I living for? What do I know? And daily he saw more clearly that he had no arisuer to give. He was fifty years old when his despair reached its height. At the summit of his fame, a happy husband and father, author of many splendid poems full of the deepest knowledge of men and of the wisdom of life, Tolstoi realized the utter impossibility of going on living. “Man cannot imagine life, without the desire for well-being. To desire and attain that well-being—is to live. Man probes life only that he may improve it.” Our science, on the contrary, investigates only the shadows of things, not their realities; and under the delusion that this unimportant secondary is the essential, science distorts the idea of life and forgets her true destiny, which is to fathom this very secret, not what to-day is discovered and to-morrow is forgotten.

Philosophy tells us: “You are a part of Humanity, therefore you must co-operate in the development of Humanity and in the realising of its ideals; your life’s goal coincides with that of all other men.” But how does it help me to know that I live for that for which all Humanity lives, when I am not told what it is for which that very Humanity does live? Why does the world exist? What is the outcome of the fact that it does exist and will exist? Philosophy gives no answer.

Skepticism, Nihilism, Despair—thither the thinking man is driven by such thoughts, if he seeks the last word of Wisdom in the Science and Philosophy of the schools. Such, too, is the real, inner, mental condition of many an one, both without and within the Theosophical Society.

In regard to this, the problem of life, Tolstoi divides men in general into four classes:—

Some, young and feeble of intellect, live happily in their ignorance—for them the problem of life has, as yet, no existence.

Others know and understand the problem well enough, but turn purposely away from it, favored by fortunate surroundings which permit them to pass their lives as it were in intoxication.

The third group consists of those who know that death is better than a life passed in error and ignorance; but they live on, because they lack the strength to put a sudden end to the fraud—life.

Finally, there are the strong and consistent natures, who grasp the whole stupidity of the farce being played with them, therefore put an end to this silly farce at one stroke.

“I could do nothing,” he says, “but think, think of the horrible position I was in. . . . My inner condition at that time, which brought me near to suicide, was such that everything I had hitherto done, everything I could still do, seemed to me foolish and bad. Even what was most precious to me in life, what had so far drawn away my eyes from the cruel reality—my family and my art—even these lost all value for me “

From this depth of despair he escaped at length. “Life is all,” he reasoned, “I, my reason itself, are products of this general life. But at the same time Reason is the creator and the final judge of human life proper. How then can reason deny to the latter a meaning without denying itself and calling itself senseless? Hence I am only calling life meaningless, because I do not grasp its meaning “ Convinced that Life has a meaning, Tolstoi sought this meaning among those who really live—the people. But there he again met disappointment, the bitterest of all, because here lay his last hope. For, among the people, he found only a solution of life’s problem resting upon a conception of
the universe which is *contrary to reason*, and is based upon that blind faith he had long since cast aside.

“I subjected,” he tells us, “the *dicta* of my reason to a fresh examination, and found that Reason did not suffice to answer my questions, because it does not bring into its reasoning the conception of the Infinite (Cause-less, Time-less, Space-less); because it explains my life, passed in Time, Space, and Causality, in terms of Time, Space, and Causality again: thus explaining it indeed with logical correctness, but only in terms of the same components, *i.e.*, leaving its ultimate basis—with which alone we are concerned—unexplained. Religion, on the contrary, does the exact opposite: she knows no logic, but does know the conception of the Infinite, to which she refers everything, and, to that extent, gives correct answers. Religion says: Thou shalt live according to the law of God; the outcome of thy life will be eternal suffering or eternal happiness; the meaning of thy life, which is not annihilated by death, is union with the Infinite Deity . . .”. The conception of the Infinite Deity, of the divinity of the Soul, of the relations of human actions to God: These are conceptions, which have been ripened in the hidden infinite of human thought, and without which there would be no life, and I too should not exist.

“But what is God? On what train of thought rests the belief in his existence and in the relation of man to him? If I am,” reasoned Tolstoi, “there must be a reason for my being, and a reason for that ground, and an ultimate reason, and this is God. I felt calmed; my uncertainty and the consciousness of standing orphaned in life vanished. But when I asked myself: What is God? How shall I act towards him? I found only *banal* answers that destroyed my faith again. . . . But that I have the conception of God in me, the *fact* and the *necessity* of this conception—of this no one can deprive me. Whence then this conception? Whence its necessity? This necessity is God himself. And I felt glad again. All things around me lived, and had a meaning. The conception of God is not indeed God himself; but the *necessity* of forming this conception, the craving for a knowledge of God, through which knowledge I live—that is God, the living and life-giving God. . . . Live in the thought, thou art a manifestation of God, and then thy life will testify to the existence of God.”

Tolstoi had regained Faith, “the evidence of things not seen,” and his religious faith expressed itself for three years in a life in strict conformity with the most stringent prescriptions of the orthodox Greek Church. But at last, finding the Church and the entire Christian community acting in direct contradiction to his root-conception of true Religion, he broke loose from orthodoxy and set out to determine what is True in Religion for himself from the study of the New Testament.

But before considering the conclusions he reached, let us examine for a moment, from the Theosophical standpoint, Tolstoi’s fundamental position. His argument for the existence of an Infinite God as the necessary “ultimate ground” of human reason, is precisely one of the Theosophist’s arguments for the existence of Kosmic or Universal Mind, and, as an argument, it proves nothing more. Influenced by Western habits of feeling, he ascribes to the Universal Mind anthropomorphic attributes which it cannot possess, thus sowing the seeds of the strained and forced conclusions as to practical action which he subsequently arrives at. Fundamentally he is right; but in the effort to satisfy the demands of his emotional nature he falls into a quasi-anthropomorphicism. For us, however, more importance attaches to the poignant picture he presents of the mental misery that tortures every honest thinker to-day, and to his pointing out of the road, the only road, by which an escape is possible. For starting from his basis we are led, if we reason carefully and closely, to the basic conclusions of Theosophical teaching, as will be seen later.

To return to Tolstoi’s religious unfoldment. Studying the Gospels, he came to find the kernel, the essence of Jesus’ teaching in the Sermon on the Mount, understood in its literal, simple sense, “even as a little child would understand it.” He considers as the perfect expression of Christ’s law of Charity and Peace, the command, “Resist not evil,” which to him is the most perfect rendering of *true* Christianity, and this command he describes as “the sole and eternal law of God and of men.” He also points out that long before the appearance of the historical Jesus, this law was known and recognised by all the leaders and benefactors of the human race. “The progress of mankind towards good,” he writes, “is brought about by those who suffer, not
by those who inflict, martyrdom.”

Such is the essence of Tolstoi’s religion; but we shall be better able to enter into its real meaning and appreciate his practical deductions therefrom, after having examined, first, his doctrine of religious bliss, and second, his philosophy of life.

I believe, says Tolstoi: (1) that happiness on earth depends solely upon the fulfilling of Christ’s teaching; (2) that its fulfilment is not only possible, but easy and full of joy. Happiness, he teaches, is love towards all men, union with them, and evil is the breach of this unity. Love and unity are the natural condition of men, in which all men find themselves who are not led astray by false teachings.

These conceptions changed his whole view of life; all he had before striven for, all that counts for so much in the world, honor, fame, culture, riches, increased refinement of life, of surroundings, of food, of clothing, of manners—all this lost its value in his eyes, and in place of them he came to esteem what the World calls bad and low, simplicity, poverty, want of culture. But the real essence of his teaching lies in the conception of the Universal Brotherhood of mankind.

For Tolstoi, Life means the striving of man after well being, after happiness, a happiness only to be attained, as we have seen, through the fulfilment of the commands of Jesus. Of these commands the deepest meaning is: true life, therefore also true happiness, consists—not in the preservation of one’s personality, but—in absorption into the All, into God and Humanity. Since God is Reason, the Christian teaching may be formulated thus: subordinate thy personal life to reason, which demands of thee unconditional love for all beings.¹

The personal life, that which recognises and wills only one’s own “I,” is the animal life; the life of reason is the human, the existence proper to man according to his nature as man. The crowning maxim of Stoic ethics: live according to nature, according to thy human nature, expresses the same thing. The teachings of the wisest lawgivers: the Brahmans, Gautama Buddha, Confucius, Lao-Tze, Moses, all contain the same explanation of life, make the same demand upon the man.

For from the remotest times onwards, Humanity has ever been conscious of the torturing inner contradiction, wherein all who seek after personal well-being find themselves. As, unfortunately, there is no other solution of this contradiction except to transfer the centre of attraction of one’s existence² from the personality, which can never be saved from destruction, to the everlasting All, it is intelligible that all the sages of the past, and with them also the greatest thinkers of later centuries, have established doctrines and moral laws identical in their general meaning because they saw more clearly than other men both this contradiction and its solution.

It is not difficult to see wherein consists the basic contradiction of personal life. That which for man is the most important, that alone which he desires, that which—as it seems to him—alone really lives, namely his personality, is destroyed, because a skeleton, decays, does not remain “himself”; while that which he does not desire, which has no value for him, the life and welfare of which he does not feel, the whole outside world of struggling beings, that proves itself to be that which endures, which truly lives.

With the awakening of the reasoning consciousness, which must occur sooner or later in every man, he becomes conscious of the gulf between the animal and the human life; he realises this more and more fully, till at last—on the highest plane of consciousness—the fundamental contradiction of life is recognised as only an apparent contradiction, pertaining solely to the sphere of animal existence, and the meaning of life, after which the personal man seeks in vain, is at last discovered. It is not discovered by logical deduction, but intuitively. The spiritually awakened or regenerated man suddenly finds himself transported into the eternal, timeless condition of the life of pure “Reason,” in which can be no more illusions, contradictions, riddles. . . . The life of reason is, as the original and only true life, also the normal life of man: and man as such can only be called “living” in so far as he subdues the animal in him under the law of Reason; precisely as the animal only really lives when it obeys, not only the laws of the

¹ Absolutely the same doctrine as that taught by Buddha and all other Initiates, Plato included. A fact recognised by Tolstoi, though not given its due significance by him.

² Where thy treasure is, there will thy heart be also

³ Meaning Plato’s “Noetic Life.”
MORALITY AND RELIGION

matter which composes it, but also the higher law of organic life. . . . When once it has been recognised that, in specifically human life, the primacy naturally belongs not to the personality, but to the Reason, there is nothing super-human in following the natural law of human life and both regarding and using as a tool what is a mere tool of the true life—the personality. . . . But it may be asked: Why then do we have a personality if we are to renounce it, deny it? In order that the personality, like any tool, may serve merely as a means to an end—other answer there is none. The personality is nothing but the “spade,” that is given to the reasoning being to be dug with, to be blunted in that digging and then sharpened again, to be used up, but not to be cleaned and stored away. To use a tool as a tool is not to deny it, but simply to make it serve its proper purpose, i.e., Reason.

This is Tolstoi’s philosophy of life, identical in its basis with that of Theosophy. But lacking the universality of the latter, leaning too exclusively upon the corrupted and fragmentary dicta of but one Teacher of Wisdom, Tolstoi’s philosophy fails to guide him in practice and, as a study of his work shows, lands him eventually in self-contradiction. This self-contradiction, however, being but of the surface, of the physical plane only, is of relatively small importance, contrasted with the real escape he has made beyond the delusions in which most of us live.

Want of space renders it impossible to follow out into further detail the comparison between Tolstoi’s views and those of Theosophy. Every reader of Lucifer can readily do so for himself, and we will only add that Dr. Von Koeber’s essay, which has supplied the material for the above sketch, and of which it is mainly a summary, is worthy the careful study of every one who can read German. Of the Appendix, which Dr. Hiiibbe Schleiden has tackled on thereto, it must be said to show a want of appreciation and understanding of the true spirit and meaning of Tolstoi’s thought and action, which seems to indicate the same misconception of the nature of real “mysticism,” that may be noticed in the same writer’s other essays.

O NE need not belong to the Theosophical Society to be forcibly struck with the correctness of the above remarks. The accepted creeds of the civilized nations have lost their restraining influence on almost every class of society; nor have they ever had any other restraint save that of physical fear: the dread of theocratic thumb-screws, and hell-tortures. The noble love of virtue, for virtue’s own sake, of which some ancient Pagan nations were such prominent exemplars has never blossomed in the Christian heart at large, nor have any of the numerous post-christian philosophies answered the needs of humanity, except in isolated instances. Hence, the moral condition of the civilized portions of mankind has never been worse than it is now—not even, we believe, during the period of Roman decadence. Indeed, if our greatest masters in human nature and the best writers of Europe, such acutepsychologists—true vivisectors of moral man—as Count Tolstoi in Russia, Zola in France, and as Thackery and Dickens in England before them, have not exaggerated facts—and against such an optimistic view we have the

Lucifer, July, 1890

DIAGNOSES AND PALLIATIVES

“That the world is in such bad condition morally, is conclusive evidence that none of its religions and philosophies, those of the civilized races less than any other, have ever possessed the truth. The right and logical explanation of the subject, of the problems of the great dual principles—right and wrong, good and evil, liberty and despotism, pain and pleasure, egotism and altruism—are as impossible to them now as they were 1881 years ago: they are as far from the solution as they ever were. . . .”

(From an Unpublished Letter; well known to Theosophists.)
records of the criminal and divorce courts in addition to Mrs. Grundy’s private sessions “with closed doors”—then the inner rottenness of our Western morality surpasses anything the old Pagans have ever been accused of. Search carefully, search far and wide throughout the ancient classics, and even in the writings of the Church Fathers breathing such hatred to Pagans—and every vice and crime fathered upon the latter will find its modern imitator in the archives of the European tribunals. Yea, “gentle reader,” we Europeans have servilely imitated every iniquity of the Pagan world, while stubbornly refusing to accept and follow any one of its grand virtues.

Withal, we moderns have undeniably surpassed the ancients in one thing—namely, in the art of whitewashing our moral sepulchres; of strewing with fresh and blooming roses the outside walls of our dwellings, to hide the better the contents thereof, the dead men’s bones and all uncleanness, and making them, “indeed, appear beautiful without.” What matters it that the “cup and platter” of our heart remain unclean if they “outwardly appear righteous unto men”? To achieve this object, we have become past-masters in the art of blowing trumpets before us, that we “may have glory of men.” The fact, in truth, that we deceive thereby neither neighbor nor kinsman, is a matter of small concern to our present generations of hypocrites, who live and breathe on mere appearances, caring only for outward propriety and prestige. These will moralize to their neighbors, but have not themselves even the moral courage of that cynical but frank preacher who kept saying to his congregation: “Do as I bid you, but do not do as I do.”

Cant, cant, and always cant; in politics and religion, in Society, commerce, and even literature. A tree is known by its fruits; an Age has to be judged by its most prominent authors. The intrinsic-sic moral value of any particular period of history has generally to be inferred from what its best and most observant writers had to say of the habits, customs, and ethics of their contemporaries and the classes of Society they have observed or been living in. And what now do these writers say of our Age, and how are they themselves treated?

Zola’s works are finally exiled in their English translations; and though we have not much to say against the ostracism to which his Nana and La Terre have been subjected, his last—La Bête Humaine—might have been read in English with some profit. With “Jack the Ripper” in the near past, and the hypnotic rage in the present, this fine psychological study of the modern male neurotic and “hysteric,” might have done good work by way of suggestion. It appears, however, that prudish England is determined to ignore the truth and will never allow a diagnosis of the true state of its diseased morals to be made—not by a foreign writer at all events. First, then, have departed Zola’s works, forcibly exiled. At this many applauded, as such fictions, though vividly pointing out some of the most hidden ulcers in social life, were told really too cynically and too indecently to do much good. But now comes the turn of Count Lev Tolstoi. His last work, if not yet exiled from the bookstalls, is being rabidly denounced by the English and American press. In the words of “Kate Field’s Washington” why? Does “The Kreutzer Sonata” defy Christianity? No. Does it advocate laxmor-als? No. Does it make the reader in love with that “intelligent beast” Pozdnisheff? On the contrary. . . Why then is the Kreutzer Sonata so abused? The answer comes: “because Tolstoi has told the truth,” not as averred “very brutally,” but very frankly, and “about a very brutal condition of things” certainly; and we, of the 19th century, have always preferred to keep our social skeletons securely locked in our closets and hidden far away from sight. We dare not deny the terribly realistic truths vomited upon the immorality of the day and modern society of Pozdnisheff; but—we may call the creator of Pozdnisheff names. Did he not indeed dare to present a mirror to modern Society in which it sees its own ugly face? Withal, he offers no possible cure for our social sores. Hence, with eyes lifted heavenward and foaming mouths, his critics maintain that, all its characteristic realism notwithstanding, the “Kreutzer Sonata is a prurient book, like to effect more harm than good, portraying vividly the great immorality of life, and offering no possible remedy for it” (Vanity Fair). Worse still. “It is simply repulsive. It is daring beyond measure and without excuse; . .
Thus the author of “Anna Karenina” and of the “Death of Ivan Ilyitch,” the greatest psychologist of this century, stands accused of ignoring “human nature” by one critic, of being “the most conspicuous case out of Bedlam,” and by another (Scot’s Observer) called “the ex-great artist.” “He tilts,” we are told, “against the strongest human instincts” because—forsoth—tells us that far better no marriage at all than such a desecration of what his church regards as one of the holy Sacraments. But in the opinion of the Protestant Vanity Fair, Tolstoi is “an extremist,” because “with all its evils, the present marriage system, taken even as the vile thing for which he gives it us (italics are ours) is a surely less evil than the monasticism—with its effects—which he preaches.” This shows the ideas of the reviewer on morality!

Tolstoi, however, “preaches” nothing of the sort; nor does his Pozdnisheff say so, though the critics misunderstand him from A to Z, as they do also the wise statement that “not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man; but that which cometh out of the mouth” or a vile man’s heart and imagination. It is not “monasticism” but the law of continence as taught by Jesus (and Occultism) in its esoteric meaning—which most Christians are unable to perceive—that he preaches. Nothing can be more moral or more conducive to human happiness and perfectibility than the application of this law. It is one ordained by Nature herself. Animals follow it instinctively, as do also the savage tribes. Once pregnant, to the last day of the nursing of her babe, i.e., for eighteen or twenty months, the savage squaw is sacred to her husband; the civilised and semi-civilised man alone breaking this beneficent law. Therefore, speaking of the immorality of marriage relations as at present practised, and of unions performed on commercial bases, or, what is worse, on mere sensual love, Pozdnisheff elaborates the idea by uttering the greatest and the holiest truths, namely, that:

“For morality to exist between men and women in their daily life, they must make perfect chastity their law. In progressing towards this end, man subdues himself. When he has arrived at the last degree of subjection we shall have moral marriages. But if a man as in our Society advances only towards physical love, even though he surrounds it with deception and with the shallow formality of marriage, he obtains nothing but licensed vice.

A good proof that it is not “monasticism” and utter celibacy which are preached, but only continence, is found on page 84 where the fellow-traveller of Pozdnisheff is made to remark that the result of the theory of the latter would be “that a man would have to keep away from his wife except once every year or two.” Then again there is this sentence:

“I did not at that time understand that the words of the Gospel as to looking upon a woman with the eyes of desire did not refer only to the wives of others, but especially and above all to one’s own wife.”

“Monastics” have no wives, nor do they get married if they would remain chaste on the physical plane. Tolstoi, however, seems to have answered in anticipation of British criticism and objections on these lines, by making the hero of his “grimy and revolting book” (Scot’s Observer) say:

“Think what a perversity of ideas there must be, when the happiest, the freest condition of the human being, that of (mental) chastity, is looked upon as something miserable and ridiculous. The highest ideal, the most perfect condition to be attained by woman, that of a pure being, a vestal, a virgin, provokes, in our society, fear and laughter.”

Tolstoi might have added—and when moral continence and chastity, mistaken for “monasticism,” are pronounced far more evil than “the marriage system taken even as the vile thing for which he (Tolstoi) gives it us.” Has the virtuous critic of Vanity Fair or the Scot’s Observer never met with a woman who, although the mother of a numerous family, had withal remained all her life mentally and morally a pure virgin, or with a vestal (in vulgar talk, a spinster) who although physically undefiled, yet surpassed in mental, unnatural depravity the lowest of the fallen women? If he has not—we have.

We maintain that to call “Kreutzer Sonata” pointless, and “a vain book,” is to miss most egregiously the noblest as well as the most

1 All the italics throughout the article are ours
important points in it. It is nothing less than wilful blindness, or what is still worse—that moral cowardice which will sanction every growing immorality rather than allow its mention, let alone its discussion, in public. It is on such fruitful soil that our moral leprosy thrives and prospers instead of being checked by timely palliatives. It is blindness to one of her greatest social evils of this kind that led France to issue her unrighteous market-place, with a rope around her neck; the right of every beggar-husband over his rich wife’s fortune, rights now happily abrogated. But does not law protect man to this day, granting him means for legal impunity in almost all his dealings with woman?

Has it never occurred to any grave judge or critic either—any more than to Pozdnisheff—’that immorality does not consist in physical acts alone but on the contrary, in liberating one’s self from all moral obligations, which such acts impose’?” (Kreutzer Sonata, p. 32.) And as a direct result of such legal “liberation from any moral obligations,” we have the present marriage system in every civilized nation, viz., men “steeped in corruption” seeking “at the same time for a virgin whose purity might be worthy” of them (p. 39); men, out of a thousand of whom “hardly one could be found who has not been married before at least a dozen times” (P 41)!

Aye, gentlemen of the press, and humble slaves to public opinion, too many terrible, vital truths, to be sure, are uttered by Pozdnisheff to make the”Kreutzer Sonata” ever palatable to you. The male portion of mankind—book reviewers as others—does not like to have a too faithful mirror presented to it. It does not like to see itself as it is, but only as it would like to make itself appear. Had the book been directed against your slave and creature—woman, Tolstoi’s popularity would have, no doubt, increased proportionately. But for almost the first
time in literature, a work shows male kindcove in all the artificial ugliness of the final fruits of civilization, which make every vicious man believe himself, like Pozdnisheff, “a thoroughly moral man.” And it points out as plainly that female dissimulation, worldliness and vice, are but the handiwork of generations of men, whose brutal sensuality and selfishness have led woman to seek reprisals. Hear the fine and truthful description of most Society men:—

“Women know well enough that the most noble, the most poetic love is inspired, not by moral qualities, but by physical intimacy. . . . Ask an experienced coquette . . . which she would prefer, to be convicted in the presence of the man she wishes to subjugate, of falsehood, perversity, and cruelty, or to appear before him in a dress ill-made, . . . She would choose the first alternative. She knows very well that we only lie when we speak of our lofty sentiments; that what we are seeking is the woman herself, and that for that we are ready to forgive all her ignominies, while we would not forgive her a costume badly cut. . . . Hence those abominable jerseys, those artificial protrusions behind, those naked arms, shoulders and bosoms.”

Create no demand and there will be no supply. But such demand being established by men, it . . .

“Explains this extraordinary phenomenon: that on the one hand woman is reduced to the lowest degree of humiliation, while on the other she reigns above everything. . . . ‘Ah, you wish us to be merely objects of pleasure? Very well, by that very means we will bend you beneath our yoke,’ says the women who “like absolute queens, keep as prisoners of war and at hard labor nine-tenths of the human race; and all because they have been humiliated, because they have been deprived of the rights enjoyed by man. They avenge themselves on our voluptuousness, they catch us in their nets” . . . Why? Because “the great majority look upon the journey to the church as a necessary condition for the possession of a certain woman. So you may say what you will, we live in such an abyss of falsehood, that unless some event comes down upon our head . . . we cannot wake up to the truth” . . .

The most terrible accusation, however, is an implied parallel between two classes of women, Pozdnisheff denies that the ladies in good society live with any other aims than those of fallen women, and reasons in this wise:

“If human beings differ from one another by their internal life, that ought to show itself externally; and externally, also, they will be different. Now compare women of the most unhappy, the most despised class, with
women of the highest society; you see the same dresses, the same manners, the same perfumes, the same passion for jewelry, for brilliant and costly objects; the same amusements, the same dances, music, and songs. The former attract by all possible means; the latter do the same. There is no difference, none whatever.”

And would you know why? It is an old truism, a fact pointed out by Ouida, as by twenty other novelists. Because the husbands of the “ladies in good Society”—we speak only of the fashionable majority—of course—would most likely gradually desert their legitimate wives were these to offer them too strong a contrast with the demi-mondaines whom they all adore. For certain men who for long years have constantly enjoyed the intoxicating atmosphere of certain places of amusement, the late suppers in cabinets particu-liers in the company of enamelled females artificial from top to foot, the correct demeanor of a lady, presiding over their dinner table, with her cheeks paintless, her hair, complexion and eyes as nature made them—becomes very soon a bore. A legitimate wife who imitates in dress, and mimicks the desinvolture of her husband’s mistress has perhaps been driven at the beginning to effect such a change out of sheer despair, as the only means of preserving some of her husband’s affection, once she is unable to have it undivided. Here, again, the abnormal fact of enamelled, straw-haired, painted and almost undressed wives and girls in good Society, are the handiwork of men—of fathers, husbands, brothers. Had the animal demands of the latter never created that class which Baudelaire calls so poetically les fleurs du mal, and who end by destroying every household and family whose male members have once fallen a victim to their hypnotism—no wife and mother, still less a daughter or a sister, would have ever thought of emulating the modern hetaira. But now they have. The act of despair of the first wife abandoned for a demi-mondaine has borne its fruit. Other wives have followed suit, then the transformation has gradually become a fashion, a necessity. How true then these remarks:

“The absence of women’s rights does not consist in being deprived of the right of voting, or of administering law; but in the fact that with regard to matters of affection she is not the equal of man, that she has not the right to choose instead of being chosen. That would be quite abnormal, you think. Then let men also be without their rights. ... At bottom her slavery lies in the fact of her being regarded as a source of enjoyment. You excite her, you give her all kinds of rights equal to those of man:2 but she is still looked upon as an instrument of pleasure, and she is brought up in that character from her childhood. . . . She is always the slave, humiliated and corrupted, and man remains still her pleasure-seeking master. Yes, to abolish slavery, it is first of all necessary that public opinion should admit that it is shameful to profit by the labor of one’s neighbor; and to emancipate woman it is necessary that public opinion should admit that it is shameful to regard her as an instrument of pleasure.”

Such is man, who is shewn in all the hideous nakedness of his selfish nature, almost beneath the “animals” which “would seem to know that their descendants continue the species, and they accordingly follow a certain law.” But “man alone does not, and will not, know. . . . The lord of creation—man; who, in the name of his love, kills one half of the human race! Of woman, who ought to be his helpmate in the movement of Humanity towards freedom, he makes, for the sake of his pleasures, not a helpmate but an enemy.” ....

And now it is made abundantly clear, why the author of the Kreutzer Sonatas suddenly become in the eyes of all men—“the most conspicuous case out of Bedlam.” Count Tolstoi who alone has dared to speak the truth in proclaiming the whole relation of the sexes to each other as at present, “a gross and vile abomination,” and who thus interferes with “man’s pleasures”—must, of course, expect to be proclaimed a madman. He preaches “Christian virtue,” and what men want now is vice, such as the old Romans themselves have never dreamed of. “Stone him to death”—gentlemen of the press. What you would like, no doubt, to see practically elaborated and preached from every house-top, is such articles as Mr. Grant Allen’s “The Girl of the Future.” Fortunately, for that author’s admirers, the editor of the Universal Review has laid for once aside “that exquisite tact and that rare refinement of feeling which distinguishes him from all his fellows” (if we have to believe the editor of the Scot’s Observer). Otherwise he would have never published such an uncalled-for insult to every woman, whether wife or mother. Having done with Tolstoi’s diagnosis we may now turn to Grant Allen’s palliative.

2 This, only in “semi” civilised Russia, if you please. In England she has not even the privilege of voting yet.
But even Mr. Quilter hastens while publishing this scientific effusion, to avoid identifying himself with the opinions expressed in it. So much more the pity, that it has seen the light of publicity at all. Such as it is, however, it is an essay on the “problem of Paternity and Maternity” rather than that of sex; a highly philanthropic paper which substitutes “the vastly more important and essential point of view of the soundness and efficiency of the children to be begotten” to that “of the personal convenience of two adults involved” in the question of marriage. To call this problem of the age the “Sex Problem” is one error; the “Marriage Problem,” another, though “most people call it so with illogical glib-ness.” Therefore to avoid the latter Mr. Grant Allen... “would call it rather the Child Problem, or if we want to be very Greek, out of respect to Girton, the Problem of Paedopoetics.”

After this fling at Girton, he has one at Lord Campbell’s Act, prohibiting certain too decollete questions from being discussed in public: after which the author has a third one, at women in general. In fact his opinion of the weaker sex is far worse than that of Pozdnisheff in the Kreutzer Sonata, as he denies them even the average intellect of man. For what he wants is “the opinions of men who have thought much upon these subjects and the opinions of women (if any) who have thought a little.” The author’s chief concern being “the moulding of the future British nationality,” and his chief quarrel with the higher education of women, “the broken-down product of the Oxford local examination system,” he has a fourth and fifth fling, as vicious as the rest, at “Mr. Pod-snap and Mrs. Grundy” for their pruderie, and at the “university” ladies. What, then, he queries:

... “Rather than run the risk of suffusing for one moment the sensitive cheek of the young person, we must allow the process of populating the world hap-hazard with hereditary idiots, hereditary drunkards, hereditary consumptives, hereditary madmen, hereditary weaklings, hereditary paupers to go on unchecked, in its existing casual and uncriticized fashion, for ever and ever. Let cancer beget cancer, and crime beget crime: but never for one moment suggest to the pure mind of our blushing English maiden that she has any duty at all to perform in life in her capacity as a woman, save that of gratifying a romantic and sentimental attachment to the first black moustache or the first Vandyke beard she may happen to fall in with.”... Such weakness for one “black moustache” will never do. The author has a “nobler,” a “higher” calling for the “blushing English maiden,” to wit, to keep herself in readiness to become a happy and proud mother for the good of the State, by several “black” and fair moustaches, in sequence, as we shall see, if only handsome and healthy. Thence his quarrel with the “higher education” which debilitates woman. For—

... “the question is, will our existing system provide us with mothers capable of producing sound and healthy children, in mind and body, or will it not? If it doesn’t, then inevitably and infallibly it will go to the wall. Not all the Mona Cairds and Olive Schreiners that ever lisped Greek can fight against the force of natural selection. Survival of the fittest is stronger than Miss Buss, and Miss Pipe, and Miss Helen Gladstone, and the staff of the Girls’ Public Day School Company, Limited, all put together. The race that lets its women fail in their maternal functions will sink to the nethermost abyss of limbo, though all its girls rejoice in logarithms, smoke Russian cigarettes, and act Eschylean tragedies in most aesthetic and archaic chitons. The race that keeps up the efficiency of its nursing mothers will win in the long run, though none of its girls can read a line of Lucian or boast anything better than equally-developed and well-balanced minds and bodies.”

Having done with his entree en matière, he shows us forthwith whither he is driving, though he pretends to be able to say very little in that article; only “to approach by a lateral avenue one of the minor outworks of the fortress to be stormed.” What this “fortress” is, we will now see and by the “lateral? small “avenue” judge of the magnitude of the whole. Mr. G. Allen, having diagnosed that which for him is the greatest evil of the day, now answers his own question. This is what he proposes for producing sound children out of sound—because unmarried—mothers, whom he urges to select for every new babe a fresh and well-chosen father. It is, you see—

... “what Mr. Galton aptly terms “eugenics”—that is to say a systematic endeavor towards the betterment of the race by the deliberate selection of the best possible sires, and their union for reproductive purposes with the best possible mothers.” The other “leaves the breeding of the human race entirely to chance, and it results too often in the perpetuation of disease, insanity, hysteria, folly, and every other conceivable form of weakness or vice in mind and body. Indeed, to see how foolish is our practice in the reproduction of the human race, we have only to contrast it
MORALITY AND RELIGION

with the method we pursue in the reproduction of those other animals, whose purity of blood, strength, and excellence has become of importance to us.”

“We have a fine sire of its kind, be it stallion, bull, or bloodhound, and we wish to perpetuate his best and most useful qualities in appropriate offspring. What do we do with him? Do we tie him up for life with a single dam, and rest content with such foals, or calves, or puppies as chance may send us? Not a bit of it. We are not so silly. We try him freely all round a whole large field of choice, and endeavor by crossing his own good qualities with the good qualities of various accredited mares or heifers to produce strains of diverse and well-mixed value, some of which will prove in the end more important than others. In this way we get the advantage of different mixtures of blood, and don’t throw away all the fine characteristics of our sire upon a single set of characteristics in a single dam, which may or may not prove in the end the best and fullest complement of his particular nature.”

Is the learned theorist talking here of men and women, or discussing the brute creation, or are the human and animal kinds so inseparably linked in his scientific imagination as to disable him from drawing a line of demarcation between the two? It would seem so, from the cool and easy way in which he mixes up the animal sires and dams with men and women, places them on the same level, and suggests “different mixtures of blood.” We abandon him willingly his “sires,” as, in anticipation of this scientific offer, men have already made animals of themselves ever since the dawn of civilization. They have even succeeded, while tying up their “dam” to a single “sire” under the threat of law and social ostracism, to secure for themselves full privileges from that law and Mrs. Grundy and have as great a choice of “dams” for each single “sire,” as their means would permit them. But we protest against the same offer to women to become nolens volens “accredited mares and heifers.” Nor are we prepared to say that even our modern loose morals would publicly approve of or grant Mr. Allen the “freedom” he longs for, “for such variety of experimentation,” without which, he says it is quite “impossible to turn out the best results in the end for humanity.” Animal humanity would be more correct, though he explains that it is “not merely a question of prize sheep and fat oxen, but a question of begetting the highest, finest, purest, strongest, sanest, healthiest, handsomest and morally noblest citizens.” We wonder the author does not add to these laudatory epithets, two more, viz., “the most respectful sons,” and men “proudest of their virtuous mothers.” The latter are not qualified by Mr. Grant Allen, because, perchance, he was anticipated on this point by the “Lord God” of Hosea (i. 2) who specializes the class from which the prophet is commanded to take a wife unto himself.

In a magazine whose editor has just been upholding the sacredness of marriage before the face of the author of the Kreutzer Sonata, by preceding the “Confession” of Count Tolstoi with an eulogy on Miss Tennant, “the Bride of the Season”—the insertion of “The Girl of the Future” is a direct slap in the face of that marriage. Moreover, Mr. G. Allen’s idea is not new. It is as old as Plato, and as modern as Auguste Comte and the “Oneida Community” in the United States of America. And, as neither the Greek philosopher nor the French Positivist have approached the author in his unblushing and cynical naturalism—neither in the Vth Book of the Republic, nor “the Woman of the Future” in XLI Catechism of the Religion of Positivism—we come to the following conclusion. As the name of Comte’s “Woman of the Future” is the prototype of Mr. G. Allen’s “Girl of the Future,” so the daily rites of the “mystic coupling” performed in the Oneida, must have been copied by our author and published, with only an additional peppering of still crasser materialism and naturalism. Plato suggests no more than a method for improving the human race by the careful elimination of unhealthy and deformed children, and by coupling the better specimens of both sexes; he contents himself with the “fine characteristics” of a “single sire” and “a single dam,” and would have turned away in horror at the idea of “the advantage of different mixtures of blood.” On the other hand the high-priest of Positivism, suggesting that the woman of the future “should cease to be the female of the man,” and “submitting to artificial fecundation,” thus become “the Virgin Mother without a husband” preaches only a kind of insane mysticism. Not so with Mr. Grant Allen. His noble ideal for woman is to make of her a regular brood-mare. He prompts her to follow out
... “the divine impulse of the moment, which is the voice of Nature within us, prompting us there and then (but not for a lifetime) to union with a predestined and appropriate complement of our being” and adds:

“If there is anything sacred and divine in man surely it is the internal impetus which tells him at once, among a thousand of his kind, that this particular woman, and no other, is now and here the one best fitted to become with him the parent of a suitable offspring. If sexual selection among us (men only, if you please), is more discriminative, more specialized, more capricious and more dainty than in any other species, is not that the very mark of our higher development, and does it not suggest to us that Nature herself, on these special occasions, is choosing for us anatomically the help most meet for us in our reproductive functions?”

But why “divine”? And if so, why only in man when the stallion, the hog and the dog all share this “divine impulse” with him? In the author’s view “such an occasional variation modifying and heightening the general moral standard” is ennobling; in our theosophical opinion, such casual union on momentary impulse is essentially bestial. It is no longer love but lust, leaving out of account every higher feeling and quality. By the way, how would Mr. Grant Allen like such a “divine impulse” in his mother, wife, sister or daughter? Finally, his arguments about “sexual selection” being “more capricious and dainty in man than in any other species of animal,” are pitiable. Instead of proving this “selection” “sacred and divine” he simply shows that civilized man has descended lower than any brute after all these long generations of unbridled immorality. The next thing we may be told is, that epicureanism and gluttony are “divine impulses,” and we shall be invited to see in Messalina the highest exemplar of a virtuous Roman matron.

This new “Catechism of Sexual Ethics”—shall we call it?—ends with the following eloquent appeal to the “Girl of the Future” to become the brood mares of cultured society stallions:

“This ideal of motherhood, I believe, under such conditions would soon crystallize into a religious duty. The free and educated woman, herself most often sound, sane, and handsome, would feel it incumbent upon her, if she brought forth chil-dern for the State at all, to bring them forth in her own image, and by union with a sympathetic and appropriate father instead of yielding up her freedom irrevocably to any one man, she would jealously guard it as in trust for the community, and would use her maternity as a precious gift to be sparingly employed for public purposes, though always in accordance with instinctive promptings, to the best advantage of the future offspring. ... If conscious of possessing valuable and desirable maternal qualities, she would employ them to the best advantage for the State and for her own offspring, by freely commingling them in various directions with the noblest paternal qualities of the men who most attracted her higher nature. And surely a woman who had reached such an elevated ideal of the duties of sex as that would feel she was acting far more right in becoming the mother of a child by this splendid athlete, by that profound thinker, by that nobly-moulded Adonis, by that high-souled poet, than in tying herself down for life to this rich old dotard, to that feeble young lord, to this gouty invalid, to that wretched drunkard, to become the mother of a long family of scrofulous idiots.”

And now gentlemen of the Press, severe critics of Tolstoi’s “immoral” Sonata, stern moralists who shudder at Zola’s “filthy realism,” what say you to this production of one of your own national prophets, who has evidently found honor in his own country? Such naturalistic articles as “The Girls of the Future,” published in the hugest and reddest Review on the globe, are, methinks, more dangerous for the public morals than all the Tolstoi-Zola fictions put together. In it we see the outcome of materialistic science, which looking on man only as a more highly developed animal, treats therefore its female portion on its own animalistic principles. Steeped over the ears in dense matter and in the full conviction that mankind, along with its first cousins the monkeys, is directly descended of an ape father, and a baboon mother of a now extinct species, Mr. Grant Allen must, of course, fail to see the fallacy of his own reasoning. E.g., if it is an “honor for any woman to have been loved by Shelley. . . . and to have brought into the world a son by a Newton,” and an-other “by a Goethe,” why should not the young ladies who resort to Regent Street at the small hours of night and who are soaked through and through with such “honors,” why should not they, we ask, receive public recognition and a vote of thanks from the Nation? City squares ought to be adorned with their statues, and Phryne set up hereafter as an illustrious example to Hypatia.
No more cutting insult could be offered to the decent women and respectable girls of England. We wonder how the ladies interested in the Social problems of the day will like Mr. Grant Allen’s article!

H.P.B.
Religion and morality are not synonymous. Morality does not necessarily depend upon religion, despite some making "an almost automatic assumption" to this effect.[2] According to The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics, religion and morality "are to be defined differently and have no definitional connections with each other." For many religious people, morality and religion are the same or inseparable; for them either morality is part of religion or their religion is their morality. For others, morality can be based only on religion, but morality and religion are not one. Morality as a principle does not exist without religion even though morality as a practice, as a particular case of behavior, is not dependant directly on religiousness. Atheism, after all, ends up as a negation of morality, and every true moral transformation starts with a religious renewal. Morality is a religion transformed into rules of behavior - that is, into man's attitude toward other man in accordance with the fact of God's existence. Morality and religion is the relationship between religious views and morals. Many religions have value frameworks regarding personal behavior meant to guide adherents in determining between right and wrong. PHILOSOPHY - Religion: God and Morality, Part 1. Frans de Waal: Morality Without Religion. Religion and Morality. Fantastic Destruction of Religious Morality by Christopher Hitchens. Divine Command Theory: Crash Course Philosophy #33. Transcription. Contents. 1 Relationship between religion and morality. There is absolutely no connection between morality and religion. And if religious faith improved morality, then priests wouldn't rape kids and suicide bombers wouldn't exist. Furthermore, if morality had anything to do with religion, then India would have been the most peaceful country in the world with over 6 major religions, which is unfortunately far from true.