
Tradition in the Ethics of Alasdair MacIntyre: Relativism, Thomism, and Philosophy. William Haggerty. Review of Metaphysics 58 (4):901-903 (2005). Abstract. Some critics have not found this answer to be entirely satisfying, and in chapter 3, Lutz again defends MacIntyre against the charge of relativism. A Discussion of Alasdair MacIntyre’s and Martin Luther’s Views on the Foundation of Ethics. John Horton & Susan Mendus - 1994 - In John Horton & Susan Mendus (eds.), After MacIntyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work of Alasdair MacIntyre. University of Notre Dame Press. Reasonably Traditional: Self-Contradiction and Self-Reference in Alasdair MacIntyre’s Account of Tradition-Based Rationality. Micah Lott - 2002 - Journal of Religious Ethics 30 (3):315 - 339. Alasdair MacIntyre e o tomismo: notas sobre Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry/Alasdair MacIntyre and Thomism: notes on Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry. Article. Full-text available. While some have seen in this conception of rational enquiry a defence of relativism (a charge rebutted by Lutz 2004, Kuna 2005, and Seipel 2015, the ramifications, in the context of organisational research and business ethics, is that the "traditional approach to enquiry holds to a notion of truth that seeks neither the timelessness of law-like generalizations nor the dissolution of categories. Relativism, Power and Philosophy. Author(s): Alasdair MacIntyre. Source: Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Sep., 1985), pp. 5-22 Published by: American Philosophical Association Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3131644 Accessed: 20-05-2019 21:58 UTC. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. To enquiry into a particular class of problems. Those questions arise in the first place for people who live in certain highly specific types of social and cultural situation; but this is not to say that they are not distinctively philosophical questions. Alasdair MacIntyre’s main argument, vigorously pursued in his three books After Virtue, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? and Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, is that moral philosophy is in grave disorder. The disorder is of two sorts. MacIntyre’s ambitions for Thomism seem almost Hegelian: to evolve a position which includes all possible rivals to that position as ‘moments’ or ‘partial aspects’ of itself; and, furthermore, to convince the rivals of the truth of this. MacIntyre’s Prescription: Rationality, Refutation and Synthesis. The Fact-Value Problem in Ethics. You can’t have something appearing in the conclusion of an argument which doesn’t appear in the premises of that argument. Tradition in the ethics of Alasdair MacIntyre: Relativism, Thomism, and philosophy. Lanham: Lexington Books. After an exhaustive description of MacIntyre’s changeful intellectual development and a careful examination of his understanding of tradition, Lutz sheds light on the questions whether and in what sense MacIntyre’s thinking can be called relativistic, or rather Thomistic, and, if Thomistic, philosophical after all. As a sociologist, McMyler is interested in the social and cultural impact of MacIntyre’s work. He first gives a general survey of the political and cultural influences identifiable in MacIntyre’s writings, most of all his Marxism and his apprehension of Christianity.